The derivative abuse findings (Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [i]) were proper and not violative of respondent's constitutional rights, since they were based on proof by a preponderance of the evidence (Family Ct Act § 1046 [b] [i]), including hearsay statements by one of the children corroborated by the uncontroverted medical evidence (Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [vi]; Matter of Marcos C., 186 A.D.2d 446), that respondent's youngest child had been brought to the hospital already dead as a result of severe head injuries caused by a beating administered by respondent.
Respondent's motion to relieve assigned counsel and for appointment of new counsel was also properly denied as she was not guaranteed the right to choice of assigned counsel (Family Ct Act § 262 [a] [i]; see, People v Sawyer, 57 N.Y.2d 12, 18-19, cert denied 459 U.S. 1178). There was no evidence that counsel was ineffective. Lastly, the issue of respondent's visitation is now moot.
Concur — Ellerin, J.P., Ross, Rubin and Nardelli, JJ.