Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, we find that the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant's request for an additional adjournment to enable him to produce a witness. The defendant knew the witness by name and had more than sufficient time to serve the witness with a subpoena so as to ensure his presence at trial (see, People v Green, 140 A.D.2d 370; People v Hayes, 116 A.D.2d 737). Moreover, the defendant failed to make the requisite showing that (1) the anticipated testimony would be favorable to him and not merely speculative (see, People v Rodriguez, 188 A.D.2d 494; People v Mingo, 155 A.D.2d 485; People v Brown, 78 A.D.2d 861) and (2) he exercised good faith and diligence in securing the witness's presence at trial (see, People v Spears, 64 N.Y.2d 698, 699; People v Singleton, 41 N.Y.2d 402, 405; People v Villegas, 190 A.D.2d 593; People v Brown, supra).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the record indicates that the defendant's waiver of his right to appeal his sentence imposed under Indictment 7451/90 was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent (see, People v Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1; People v Addison, 196 A.D.2d 875; People v Rozo, 196 A.D.2d 514; cf., People v Callahan, 80 N.Y.2d 273).
The sentence imposed under Indictment 9787/90 was not excessive (see, People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contention and find it to be without merit. Thompson, J.P., Bracken, Balletta and Santucci, JJ., concur.