On a motion addressed to the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and accorded every favorable inference. However, allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions, as well as factual claims either inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence, are not entitled to such consideration (Mark Hampton, Inc. v Bergreen, 173 A.D.2d 220, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 788).
The IAS Court properly dismissed the third cause of action, which, in conclusory fashion, seeks compensatory and punitive damages for conversion of the plaintiff's right to purchase a cooperative apartment for plaintiff's failure to allege, as required, that the Winard defendants exercised unauthorized or unlawful control over the plaintiff's property that interfered with the plaintiff's superior rights to the property (see, Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v Glass, 75 A.D.2d 786).
The fourth cause of action, which merely alleged that "[s]ome or all" of the defendants had asserted duress and undue influence upon the plaintiff's ward to cause her to exercise an assignment of her insider rights, was properly dismissed as conclusory and also for failure to comply with the specificity requirements of CPLR 3016 (b) (see, Mance v Mance, 128 A.D.2d 448, 449, lv dismissed and denied 70 N.Y.2d 668 ), as the cause of action failed to allege the circumstances in detail and failed to give adequate notice to the court and to the adverse parties of the transactions or occurrences intended to be proved (see, Stern v Consumer Equities Assocs., 160 A.D.2d 993, 994).
To establish a cause of action for legal malpractice, the plaintiff must show that the attorneys were negligent, that their negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages, and that the plaintiff suffered actual damages as a direct result of the attorneys' actions (see, Marshall v Nacht, 172 A.D.2d 727, 727-728). We find that the IAS Court properly dismissed the legal malpractice causes of action of the plaintiff's complaint, with prejudice, since the complaint failed to set forth the requisite allegation, that "but for" the attorneys' alleged malpractice, the plaintiff would not have sustained some actual ascertainable damages (Stroock Stroock Lavan v Beltramini, 157 A.D.2d 590, 591).
Finally, the IAS Court properly dismissed the third through seventh causes of action without leave to replead because there was no showing of merit sufficient to justify such leave and satisfy the court that the plaintiff, as the opposing party, has good ground to support the dismissed causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (e) (see, Wattson v TMC Holdings Corp., 135 A.D.2d 375, 377).
We have reviewed the plaintiff's remaining claims and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Rosenberger, J.P., Ellerin, Kupferman and Rubin, JJ.