Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant claims that the People failed to give him notice pursuant to CPL 710.30 of statements he allegedly made. We disagree. The defendant's statements to the confidential informant were both spontaneous in nature and part of the res gestae, and therefore no notice was required (see, People v Stewart, 160 A.D.2d 966; People v. Wells, 133 A.D.2d 385; People v McFadden, 126 A.D.2d 970; People v. Early, 85 A.D.2d 752).
The defendant's claim that it was reversible error to admit into evidence testimony that he attempted to sell drugs to the confidential informant several hours before his commission of the offenses for which he was indicted is without merit. The admission of the uncharged attempted drug sale was proper to prove that the defendant intended to sell the cocaine retrieved at the time of his arrest (see, People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233; People v. De Jesus, 189 A.D.2d 774; People v. Silva, 187 A.D.2d 467; People v. Gonzalez, 168 A.D.2d 568; People v. Hill, 166 A.D.2d 663). Additionally, the uncharged crime evidence served to complete the witness's narrative of the events leading up to the defendant's commission of the charged offenses (see, People v Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350; People v. Nelson, 177 A.D.2d 603; People v. Green, 170 A.D.2d 530; People v. Ortiz, 134 A.D.2d 624).
The defendant's sentence is not unduly harsh or excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Mangano, P.J., Balletta, Santucci and Hart, JJ., concur.