Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered. No questions of fact have been raised or considered.
We find that the defendant was prejudiced by the prosecutor's violation of the principle that a defendant's post-arrest silence is inadmissible for impeachment purposes in the absence of unusual circumstances (see, People v. Conyers, 52 N.Y.2d 454; compare, People v. Davis, 61 N.Y.2d 202; People v. Savage, 50 N.Y.2d 673, cert denied 449 U.S. 1016; People v. Mercer, 112 A.D.2d 790), which are not present here. The defendant testified that he was the victim rather than the perpetrator of a robbery. Over defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor asked the defendant many times whether he had apprised the police that he was a victim of a robbery rather than a perpetrator. This line of improper questioning continued until finally the defendant stated that he had told his exculpatory story to the police, who said to him: "[You] got to talk to the judge about it". In rebuttal, over the defense counsel's objection, the People recalled the arresting officer who testified that the defendant had exercised his right to remain silent at the time of his arrest. He further testified that the defendant did not say that he wanted to file a complaint against the complainant or that he was the victim of the robbery. The trial court abused its discretion by allowing the People to pursue this improper line of inquiry. Since the evidence of the defendant's guilt is less than overwhelming, we find that the error cannot be deemed harmless (see, People v Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241-242).
In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendant's remaining contentions. Bracken, J.P., Sullivan, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.