EASKOLD v. RHODES

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Docket Number

No. 93-1676.

Attorney(S)

Robert P. Gaines, Beggs Lane, Pensacola, for appellant. Thomas E. Wheeler, Jr., Bell, Schuster Wheeler, Pensacola, for appellee.

Judges

Charles A. Davis

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Elouise Rhodes was injured in a car accident involving Donna Easkold and sued Easkold for negligence. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Rhodes on October 19, 1990, awarding $37,000 and finding no permanent injury. Easkold tendered payment equal to the verdict amount conditioned on completion of a satisfaction of judgment, which Rhodes rejected. Rhodes then moved for a new trial challenging the jury's finding on permanent injury, but the trial court denied the motion and entered judgment on December 21, 1990. Rhodes appealed the denial of the new trial, and this Court reversed for a new trial. The Florida Supreme Court later reversed that decision and reinstated the judgment. Easkold tendered payment again under the same conditions, which Rhodes again rejected. Rhodes subsequently filed a motion for taxation of costs on March 18, 1993.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a conditional tender of payment is sufficient to stop the running of post-judgment interest on a judgment.
When post-judgment interest begins to run: from the date of the jury verdict or from the date the judgment is filed with the court clerk.
Whether post-judgment interest is available on costs that were not awarded until after the appellate court's mandate reinstated the jury verdict.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Easkold argued that the tenders of payment should stop the accrual of interest on the judgment despite being conditioned on satisfaction of judgment.
Appellant contended that post-judgment interest should run from the date of the jury verdict rather than the date the judgment was filed.

Appellee's Arguments

Rhodes rejected the conditional tenders and maintained that interest should continue to run on the judgment.
Rhodes argued that post-judgment interest on costs should relate back to the date of the jury verdict or at least the original judgment date.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Devolder v. Sandage, 575 So.2d 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)	Conditional tender of payment does not stop the running of interest on a judgment.	The court affirmed that Easkold’s tenders were conditional and thus insufficient to halt interest accrual.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Powell, 513 So.2d 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), review denied mem., 520 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1988)	Post-judgment interest begins to run from the date the judgment is filed with the court clerk, not from the date of jury verdict.	The court reversed the trial court’s ruling and held that interest runs from the judgment filing date.
Smith v. Dunning, 467 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)	Interest cannot be allowed before the entry of judgment in jury-decided tort cases.	Supported the position that interest does not run from the jury verdict date.
Fischbach Moore, Inc. v. McBro, 619 So.2d 324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)	Post-judgment interest on costs may relate back to the date of the judgment establishing entitlement to costs, even if amount is determined later.	The court distinguished this case, noting that Rhodes delayed cost taxation and thus interest should not run from the earlier date.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first analyzed whether the tenders of payment by Easkold stopped the accrual of interest. It concluded that because both tenders were conditional—requiring satisfaction of judgment—the interest continued to run, citing Devolder v. Sandage. Next, the court addressed when post-judgment interest begins to run. It held that the trial court erred in starting interest from the jury verdict date, reaffirming the principle that interest accrues only after the judgment is filed with the clerk, supported by Allstate Ins. Co. v. Powell and Smith v. Dunning. Finally, the court considered Rhodes’ cross-appeal regarding interest on costs. Although Fischbach Moore, Inc. v. McBro held that interest on costs can relate back to the judgment date, the court found the facts distinguishable because Rhodes delayed filing for costs. Therefore, interest on costs should run from the date the costs were awarded, not from the original judgment or verdict date.

Holding and Implications

The court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

The court held that (1) conditional tenders of payment do not stop the running of post-judgment interest; (2) post-judgment interest begins to run from the date the judgment is filed with the court clerk, not from the jury verdict date; and (3) interest on costs is not available from the date of the verdict or original judgment if the prevailing party delays cost taxation, but instead runs from the date the costs are awarded. The direct effect is that Easkold must pay accrued interest on the judgment from the filing date and on costs from the award date. No new precedent was established beyond applying existing principles to the facts of this case.

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DONNA EASKOLD, APPELLANT, v. ELOUISE RHODES, APPELLEE.

DAVIS, Judge.

Appellant Donna Easkold appeals an order ruling that a tender of payment of the amount of a judgment was inadequate to stop the running of interest on that judgment, and that the post-judgment interest runs from the date of the jury verdict setting the amount of the damages owed. Elouise Rhodes cross appeals the trial court ruling that "post-judgment interest is not available on costs not awarded until after the appellate court's mandate" reinstating the jury verdict in this case. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Elouise Rhodes was injured in a car accident with Donna Easkold, and sued Easkold for negligence. A jury verdict in favor of Rhodes was entered on October 19, 1990, in the amount of $37,000. The jury expressly found that Rhodes suffered no permanent injury. Easkold tendered a draft in the amount of the jury verdict, with a letter asking for completion of a satisfaction of judgment. Rhodes rejected the tender and moved for a new trial on the grounds that the jury erred in finding no permanent injury. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, and entered judgment for $37,000 on December 21, 1990.

Rhodes appealed the denial of the motion for new trial. This Court reversed for a new trial, Rhodes v. Easkold, 588 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The Supreme Court of Florida reversed, and reinstated the judgment. Easkold v. Rhodes, 614 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1993). Easkold tendered a second draft for $37,000, with the same request for completion of a satisfaction of judgment. This tender was also rejected. Rhodes' motion for taxation of costs was filed March 18, 1993.

First, the trial court was correct that these two attempted tenders of payment were insufficient to stop the running of interest on the judgment because they were not unconditional. The proposed satisfaction of judgment rendered the tender conditional. Devolder v. Sandage, 575 So.2d 312, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Therefore, Easkold must pay interest on the judgment. On this point we affirm the trial court.

The next question is when the interest started running. The trial court held that the interest runs from the date of the jury verdict. This was error. Post-judgment interest begins to run when the judgment has been filed with the clerk of the court. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Powell, 513 So.2d 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), review dented mem., 520 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1988). Appellant's argument that this rule does not pertain in cases decided by jury is not persuasive. See, e.g., Smith v. Dunning, 467 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (holding that interest cannot be allowed before entry of judgment in a tort case decided by jury).

Finally, Rhodes cross appeals the trial court order stating that "post-judgment interest is not available on costs not taxed until after entry of the appellate court's mandate." Rhodes seeks interest on the costs from the date of the jury verdict, or, at least, the date of the original judgment, December 21, 1990. The basis for seeking interest from the date of the judgment is the fact that the judgment awarded costs, with the amount to be determined later.

This court recognizes that in Fischbach Moore, Inc. v. McBro, 619 So.2d 324, 325 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), the Third District Court of Appeal held that post-judgment interest for costs dates back to the date of the judgment establishing the entitlement to costs, even if the specific amount of the costs is not decided until later. However, that case is factually distinguishable from this one. In McBro, the court stated that the interest relates back to the original judgment because it would be unfair to penalize the prevailing party when the non-prevailing party decides to contest the award. In this case it was Rhodes, the prevailing party, who was responsible for the motions and appeals which delayed the entry of an award of costs. Rhodes did not even file a motion for costs until March 1993. We affirm the judgment of the trial court that interest on the costs is not available from the date of the verdict or the December 21, 1990, judgment. The interest should run from the date of the order setting the amount of the costs awarded.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part.

ZEHMER, C.J., and SHIVERS, Senior Judge, concur.