Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, the defendants' motion is denied, the indictment is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is well-settled that the court may only grant a motion to dismiss the indictment where "[t]he evidence before the grand jury was not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged or any lesser included offense" (CPL 210.20 [b]; People v Deitsch, 97 A.D.2d 327, 328; People v. Leichtweis, 59 A.D.2d 383, 387). The burden is on the defendant to make a clear showing of legal insufficiency (see, People v. Adorno, 112 A.D.2d 308, 309), and the court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 299, cert denied 450 U.S. 1031). Upon a motion to dismiss for legal insufficiency it must only be shown that the People presented a prima facie case (see, People v. Flores, 122 A.D.2d 806). Questions as to the quality or weight of the proof are deferred and the evidence may be legally sufficient even if it does not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v Jennings, 69 N.Y.2d 103, 115).
Bearing these principles in mind, we find that the defendants failed to make a clear showing that the evidence presented to the Grand Jury, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People, was legally insufficient to establish their constructive possession of the drugs and weapons found with the defendants inside a locked store. Where the People's presentation relies upon circumstantial evidence, the evidence before the Grand Jury need not exclude to a moral certainty every hypothesis consistent with innocence (see, People v. Deegan, 69 N.Y.2d 976; People v Vallone, 140 A.D.2d 729). Thus, the court erred in dismissing the indictment. Mangano, P.J., Balletta, Friedmann and Florio, JJ., concur.