Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Contrary to the defendant's contention, the identity of the person to whom he sold drugs is not a material element of the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (see, Penal Law § 220.39; People v. Charles, 61 N.Y.2d 321, 328; People v. Feldman, 50 N.Y.2d 500, 504; People v. Butler, 191 A.D.2d 503).
The defendant also contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for a missing witness charge with respect to the arresting officer's partner. This contention is without merit as the People met their burden of establishing that the testimony would have been cumulative (see, People v. Gonzalez, 68 N.Y.2d 424; People v. Tate, 199 A.D.2d 291; People v. Morris, 168 A.D.2d 464).
We also find that the trial court's refusal to give an expanded identification charge was not error. The charge properly instructed the jury as to both the People's burden of proving identification beyond a reasonable doubt, and the general factors relevant to an evaluation of the witnesses' veracity and accuracy of their observations (see, People v. Whalen, 59 N.Y.2d 273, 279; People v. Navallo, 186 A.D.2d 156; People v. Sorrentino, 138 A.D.2d 760).
Finally, the court's instruction with respect to the presumption of innocence adequately conveyed to the jury the significance of that fundamental safeguard (see, People v Brown, 150 A.D.2d 472). Bracken, J.P., Miller, O'Brien and Altman, JJ., concur.