McMURRAY, Presiding Judge.
Via indictment, defendant was charged with aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. He was acquitted on the aggravated assault charge and convicted on the possession of a firearm charge. His motion for a new trial was denied and he appealed. In his sole enumeration of error, defendant asserts his acquittal on the aggravated assault charge demands a reversal of his conviction on the possession of a firearm charge. We disagree. Held:
"While it may be difficult to reconcile the conviction of defendant with the . . . jury's verdict acquitting defendant of the [aggravated assault charge], we note that the inconsistent verdict rule was abolished in Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 562 (2) ( 341 S.E.2d 216). See also Allen v. State, 203 Ga. App. 359 ( 416 S.E.2d 869). The evidence at trial must be viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict of the jury. Since there is ample evidence that defendant [used a firearm in the commission of a crime], a rational trier of fact was authorized to conclude that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of possession of a firearm [during the commission of a crime]. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560); Dorsey v. State, 206 Ga. App. 709, 715 (7) ( 426 S.E.2d 224)." Garcia v. State, 208 Ga. App. 808 ( 432 S.E.2d 122). See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 ( 105 SC 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461) (1984).
Judgment affirmed. Pope, C. J., and Smith, J., concur.
DECIDED MARCH 9, 1994.