Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
The plaintiff Douglas Baker has failed to establish a prima facie case that he sustained "serious injury" within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). While the plaintiffs submitted a medical report and an affidavit in which a chiropractor characterized Douglas Baker's alleged disability as "permanent", the chiropractor did not indicate with any specificity any limitation in Baker's range of movement subsequent to one week after the accident (see, Licari v. Elliott, 57 N.Y.2d 230; O'Neill v. Rogers, 163 A.D.2d 466). Moreover, Baker returned to work approximately two weeks after the accident. Thus, he was not prevented from performing substantially all of the material acts that constituted his customary daily activities for 90 out of the 180 days following the accident (see, Insurance Law § 5102 [d]; Licari v. Elliott, supra; Grotzer v. Levy, 133 A.D.2d 67). He conceded at his examination before trial that he swims, plays tennis, plays baseball, and bowls. His continuing subjective complaints of pain are insufficient to establish serious injury within the meaning of the statute (see, Scheer v. Koubek, 70 N.Y.2d 678; Tipping-Cestari v. Kilhenny, 174 A.D.2d 663). Sullivan, J.P., Lawrence, Pizzuto, Joy and Goldstein, JJ., concur.