Order insofar as appealed from unanimously reversed on the law without costs and motion granted. Memorandum: Supreme Court should have granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment with respect to liability on plaintiff's Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action against Mark IV Construction Co., Inc. (Mark IV) and defendant Dun-Rite Heating, Inc. (Dun-Rite).
By showing that he fell from an elevated worksite while engaging in activity protected under Labor Law § 240 (1), and that his injuries were proximately caused by the failure of Mark IV and Dun-Rite to provide proper safety devices "constructed, placed and operated" for his protection, plaintiff demonstrated his entitlement to summary judgment (Labor Law § 240; see, Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 N.Y.2d 513; Halkias v Hamburg Cent. School Dist., 186 A.D.2d 1040).
The fact that plaintiff's accident was unwitnessed does not preclude summary judgment (see, Halkias v Hamburg Cent. School Dist., supra; Marasco v Kaplan, 177 A.D.2d 933; cf., Wentland v Occidental Chem. Corp., 188 A.D.2d 1030; Carlos v Rochester Gen. Hosp., 163 A.D.2d 894). Moreover, the record reveals that all of plaintiff's statements relate a consistent and coherent version of the occurrence of the accident and, therefore, speculation by Mark IV and Dun-Rite that the accident may have occurred in another manner is not sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see, Damon v Stark-weather, 185 A.D.2d 633).