Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
We agree with the appellants' general contention that a court which renders a judgment possesses broad, inherent discretion to vacate it on such terms as are just (see, CPLR 5015 [a]; see, Ladd v. Stevenson, 112 N.Y. 325). However, in this case, even assuming that the appellants' claims make out extrinsic fraud in the procurement of the default judgment of foreclosure which constituted a reasonable excuse for their default, and that they were not required to establish a meritorious defense (see, Shaw v. Shaw, 97 A.D.2d 403), we nevertheless conclude that the appellants failed to establish any conduct by the plaintiff bank that prevented them from fully and fairly litigating this matter (see, Christ-Mitch Realty Corp. v. Clarkson Realty Corp., 122 A.D.2d 245; cf., Sirota v. Kloogman, 140 A.D.2d 426; see also, Barrett v. Littles, 201 A.D.2d 444). Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the appellants' motion. Rosenblatt, J.P., Miller, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.