PER CURIAM:
Garry L. Sawyer (Sawyer) appeals the decision of the trial court affirming the finding of Virginia Employment Commission (VEC) that he voluntarily left his employment with Orkin Exterminating Company, Inc. (Orkin), without good cause. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. As the parties are familiar with the facts of the case, we recite them only as necessary to explain our decision.
Sawyer presents two questions on appeal: (1) whether the court erred in finding that the VEC correctly determined that Sawyer quit his employment and was disqualified from unemployment compensation, and (2) whether the court erred in upholding the VEC's finding that Sawyer was provided with a proper respirator.
I.
Under Code Sec. 60.2-618(1), an individual is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits "if the [VEC] finds such individual is unemployed because he left work voluntarily without good cause." Sawyer challenges the factual determination of the VEC that he voluntarily left his employment with Orkin. Sawyer does not assert that he left his employment with good cause.
Under Code Sec. 60.2-625(A), "the findings of the [VEC] as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to questions of law." See Shifflett v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 14 Va. App. 96, 97, 414 S.E.2d 865, 865 (1992). "The VEC's findings may be rejected only if, in considering the record as a whole, a reasonable mind would necessarily come to a different conclusion." Craft v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 8 Va. App. 607, 609, 383 S.E.2d 271, 273 (1989) (emphasis in original).
The Appeals Examiner made the following findings of fact:
[O]n September 30, 1991, the claimant called his branch manager and advised him that he was not reporting for work, as he was still sick. The manager advised the claimant that he needed him back at his job to do his route. He requested that the claimant obtain a doctor's excuse. The claimant called the doctor's office and was told that the doctor would not be at the office until 1 p.m. that day. The claimant decided that he would go into work and talk to his manager. When the claimant got to the office, he walked in and said that he was not going to be returning to work. The branch manager asked whether that meant that the claimant was quitting. The claimant said, "I guess it does." He further stated that he had discussed his situation with his father and that his father agreed that the claimant should not return to work if he is still sick.
Present in the office at that time, was the branch manager, the claimant's supervisor, and two other employees. The branch manager got a separation form used by the company and the claimant indicated on this form that he was affected by pesticides for several months, described his symptoms, and stated that he did not have a proper respirator. This separation form was signed and the claimant left the employer's office. The claimant did not contact the branch manager, nor any other member of management, that day or afterwards with regard to his employment status or to the events that occurred on September 30, 1991.
The claimant had not been advised by a physician to quit his job at this time.
Based upon the testimony and other evidence presented to her, the Appeals Examiner determined that "the employer has presented a preponderance of evidence to show that [Sawyer's] separation was voluntary." The VEC affirmed this determination, stating:
The Appeals Examiner had the opportunity to hear and observe all of the witnesses as they testified. Her conclusion that [Sawyer] had voluntarily left his job was based upon her evaluation of the evidence and her assessment of the credibility of the branch manager's testimony.
We cannot say, based upon our review of the record, that the evidence as a whole would necessarily lead us to the conclusion that Sawyer was involuntarily discharged.
II.
In her decision, the appeals examiner noted that: [t]he claimant argues that the employer did not provide him with a respirator, even through [sic] he repeatedly asked for one. However, the employer has rebutted that testimony with the sworn testimony from the claimant's previous supervisor, who saw a respirator in the claimant's truck, and the sworn testimony of the claimant's subsequent supervisor, who personally exchanged the claimant's old respirator for a new one in the middle of August of 1991.
Specifically, Charles Sumpter testified that respirators were issued to Orkin technicians in the safety kit contained in their vehicles. Sumpter personally conducted a visual inventory of Sawyer's vehicle two times a month and had seen the respirator during those inventories. Lester Bridges also regularly inspected Sawyer's vehicle and testified that he replaced Sawyer's respirator in August 1991 at Sawyer's request because Sawyer indicated his respirator was worn out.
The Orkin branch manager, Jack Broome, Jr., also testified that respirators and dust masks were regularly issued to technicians with their trucks. In addition, Broome stated that Orkin technicians were required by law to use respirators when the particular pesticide label so indicated.
Accordingly, as the factual determination of the VEC is supported by evidence in the record, it is conclusive.
Therefore, the decision of the trial court affirming the VEC determination is affirmed.
Affirmed.