Ordered that on the court's own motion, the appellant's notice of appeal is treated as an application for leave to appeal, and leave to appeal is granted (see, CPLR 5701 [c]); and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the determination is confirmed, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits.
During the hearing on his application for a use variance, the petitioner failed to meet the burden of demonstrating unnecessary hardship (see, Matter of Village Bd. v. Jarrold, 53 N.Y.2d 254, 257-258; Matter of Crossroads Recreation v. Broz, 4 N.Y.2d 39, 44-46; Matter of Miltope Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 184 A.D.2d 565, 566). Absent a factual demonstration "by dollars and cents proof [of] an inability to realize a reasonable return under existing permissible uses", the appellant properly denied the application for a use variance (Matter of Agusta v. Silvan, 201 A.D.2d 405; see also, Matter of Giava v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 188 A.D.2d 466). While the petitioner's attorney argued that the appellant failed to consider the transcript of a prior hearing held on March 2, 1989, which allegedly demonstrated unnecessary hardship, the minutes of that meeting fail to refer to any evidence other than that submitted at the continued hearing on the matter. Because the application for a use variance was properly denied, the application for an area variance was rendered academic. In any event, the petitioner failed to demonstrate practical difficulties, significant economic injury, or any other factors which would militate in favor of the granting of an area variance (see, Matter of Doyle v. Amster, 79 N.Y.2d 592, 595; Matter of Fuhst v. Foley, 45 N.Y.2d 441, 445; Conley v. Town of Brookhaven Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 40 N.Y.2d 309, 314). Thompson, J.P., Sullivan, Ritter and Friedmann, JJ., concur.