Ordered that the appeal from the trial ruling made April 3, 1991, is dismissed as no appeal lies from a trial ruling (see, Savarese v. City of N.Y. Hous. Auth., 172 A.D.2d 506); and it is further,
Ordered that the appeals from the orders entered June 24, 1991, and July 1, 1991, and the cross appeal from the order dated July 1, 1991, are dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the appeal from the judgment entered July 11, 1991, is dismissed as superseded by the order and amended judgment entered August 5, 1991; and it is further,
Ordered that the order and amended judgment dated August 5, 1991, is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that the plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs.
The appeals and cross appeal from the intermediate orders and from the trial ruling must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of the amended judgment in the action (see, Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248). The issues raised on the appeals and cross appeal from the orders and from the trial ruling are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal and cross appeal from the order and amended judgment (CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).
We conclude that the evidence presented was legally sufficient to support the verdict (see, Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499), and was not against the weight of the evidence. The plaintiff proved that the defendant fraudulently induced it to exercise an option to purchase a Westwind 2 corporate aircraft, which the plaintiff intended to use as a prototype to market its aircraft safety equipment. The record reveals that the defendant falsely represented to the plaintiff that the manufacturer of the Westwind aircraft had agreed to install in the aircraft, during its construction at a cost of $78,000, certain safety equipment to be manufactured and provided by the plaintiff. The jury's determination of fraud was clearly and convincingly demonstrated based upon a fair interpretation of the evidence presented (see, Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129, 134). Furthermore, the jury could have found that the defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to honor that part of the agreement which required it to market the plaintiff's safety equipment as optional equipment on the Westwind 2 (see, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-203).
We have considered the parties' remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Sullivan, J.P., Balletta, Altman and Friedmann, JJ., concur.