LAMB v. SCOTT

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Docket Number

1930542.

Attorney(S)

Roy O. McCord of McCord Martin, Gadsden, for appellants. William D. Hudson, Gadsden, for appellee.

Judges

SHORES, Justice.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Dollie Scott executed a durable power of attorney to her daughter, Rita Lamb. Subsequently, Dollie executed a will leaving all her property, including a farm in Etowah County, equally to her two daughters, Rita Lamb and Judy Heliste, and her stepson, Timothy Scott. After suffering a stroke that incapacitated her, Dollie’s daughter Rita, acting as attorney in fact, deeded the farm to herself and her sister Judy Heliste with right of survivorship. Dollie later died. Timothy Scott filed suit seeking to set aside the deed and requested the property be sold with proceeds divided among the joint owners, claiming joint ownership himself. The trial court granted Scott’s motion for summary judgment, declaring the deed void. Lamb and Heliste appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the deed executed by Rita Lamb, as attorney in fact under the durable power of attorney, to herself and Judy Heliste is valid as to Rita Lamb.
The effect of the deed as to Judy Heliste, considering Dollie Scott’s will and intent regarding the property.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (Lamb and Heliste)

They argued that Alabama Code § 26-1-2(b) supersedes the common law restrictions on durable powers of attorney, thereby validating the deed executed by Rita Lamb.
They contended that Dollie Scott’s intent concerning the property was a genuine issue of material fact, which should preclude summary judgment on the deed’s validity as to Heliste.

Appellee's Arguments (Timothy D. Scott)

Scott asserted that the deed executed by Rita Lamb was invalid because the durable power of attorney did not expressly authorize Lamb to convey land to herself.
Scott maintained that Dollie’s will clearly expressed her intent to leave the property equally to Lamb, Heliste, and Scott, thereby negating Lamb’s authority to deed the property exclusively to herself and Heliste.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Sevigny v. New South Federal Savings Loan Ass'n, 586 So.2d 884 (Ala. 1991)	Powers of attorney are to be strictly construed, limiting authority to powers expressly granted; donees must use the power solely for the principal’s benefit consistent with the agency purpose.	Used to affirm that Rita Lamb lacked authority to convey land to herself because the power of attorney did not expressly grant such power.
Hall v. Cosby, 288 Ala. 191, 258 So.2d 897 (1972)	Reinforces the principle that powers of attorney do not confer authority beyond what is expressly stated.	Supported the conclusion that Lamb did not have authority to deed the property to herself.
Dillard v. Gill, 231 Ala. 662, 166 So. 430 (1936)	A power of attorney does not authorize an attorney in fact to convey property to himself unless expressly granted; intent of the principal is critical and presumed to be to retain property unless clearly conveyed.	Applied to determine that the deed to Heliste was invalid because Dollie’s will expressed intent to divide property equally among Lamb, Heliste, and Scott, and she was competent to convey the property herself.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the scope of the durable power of attorney, emphasizing the well-established common law principle that such powers are strictly construed and limited to those powers expressly granted. Because Rita Lamb’s power of attorney did not explicitly authorize her to convey land to herself, the deed was invalid as to her. The court rejected Lamb and Heliste’s argument that Alabama Code § 26-1-2(b) superseded this common law rule, clarifying that the statute only preserves the effect of acts done during the principal’s incapacity if done within the granted authority, but does not expand that authority.

Regarding the deed’s effect as to Heliste, the court considered Dollie Scott’s will, executed after the power of attorney, which clearly indicated her intent to distribute the property equally among Lamb, Heliste, and Scott. The court found that if Dollie intended to transfer title exclusively to Lamb and Heliste, she would have done so while competent, rather than by will. Thus, Lamb lacked authority to deed the property to Heliste. The court also rejected the argument that intent was a disputed factual issue precluding summary judgment, noting the will’s clear expression of intent and the fiduciary duty of an attorney in fact to act solely for the principal’s benefit consistent with the agency’s purpose.

Holding and Implications

The court AFFIRMED the trial court’s summary judgment declaring the deed void.

The direct effect of this decision is that the deed executed by Rita Lamb as attorney in fact is invalid, and the property is subject to division according to Dollie Scott’s will among Lamb, Heliste, and Scott. No new precedent was established beyond reaffirming the strict construction of powers of attorney and the importance of the principal’s intent as expressed in a valid will.

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Rita D. LAMB and Judy C. Heliste v. Timothy D. SCOTT.

SHORES, Justice.

The issue in this case is the validity of a deed executed by Rita D. Lamb, the donee of a durable power of attorney, to herself and her sister, Judy C. Heliste.

Timothy D. Scott sued Lamb and Heliste, asking that the deed executed by Rita Lamb to Rita Lamb and Judy Heliste be set aside and held for naught. The complaint also asked that the property described in that deed be sold for a division of the proceeds among joint owners. (Scott claimed to be a joint owner.) Scott moved for a summary judgment. The trial court granted Scott's motion and declared the deed void. Lamb and Heliste appeal.

Dollie Scott executed a durable power of attorney to her daughter, Rita Lamb. Almost a year later, Dollie executed a will leaving all her property, including a farm located in Etowah County, to her two daughters, Rita Lamb and Judy Heliste, and her stepson, Timothy Scott, the three to share equally. About a month after Dollie executed the will, she suffered a stroke and became incapacitated; a month after Dollie suffered the stroke, Rita, as attorney in fact for Dollie, deeded Dollie's farm to herself and her sister, Judy Heliste, with right of survivorship. Dollie subsequently died.

The first issue is whether the deed executed by Rita Lamb, as attorney in fact for Dollie Scott, is valid as to Rita. Our case law is clear that powers of attorney will be construed strictly, restricting the powers to those expressly granted. Sevigny v. New South Federal Savings Loan Ass'n, 586 So.2d 884, 886-87 (Ala. 1991). Because Lamb's power of attorney did not specifically state that Lamb could convey land to herself, she was without the power to do so. Hall v. Cosby, 288 Ala. 191, 193, 258 So.2d 897, 899 (1972).

Lamb and Heliste argue that Ala. Code 1975, § 26-1-2, supersedes the case law regarding durable powers of attorney. We disagree. Lamb and Heliste specifically refer to § 26-1-2(b) as the subsection that supersedes our case law. That section provides:

"(b) All acts done by an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney during any period of disability, incompetency or incapacity of the principal have the same effect and inure to the benefit of and bind the principal and his successors in interest as if the principal were competent, not disabled and not incapacitated."

That subsection merely provides that the incapacity of the donor of a durable power of attorney does not change the effect of actions of the donee taken in conformity with the authority conferred by the power of attorney. It does not supersede the common law rules for determining the authority conferred by a power of attorney. Because the common law rule that a power of attorney grants only those powers expressly conferred remains unchanged, the trial court correctly held that the deed was void as to Lamb.

The second issue is the effect of the deed as to Heliste. It is obvious from Dollie's will, executed after she had executed the power of attorney, that Dollie's intention was to leave all her property to her two daughters and her stepson equally. If she had intended to invest Lamb and Heliste with title to the property, she would have executed the conveyance herself at the time she executed the power of attorney; she was competent to do so. Instead, when she subsequently made her will, Dollie clearly expressed her intent that the farm should go to Lamb, Heliste, and Scott, to share equally. Therefore, Lamb was also without the power to deed Dollie's farm to Heliste. See, Dillard v. Gill, 231 Ala. 662, 665, 166 So. 430, 433 (1936).

In Dillard v. Gill, Mrs. Dillard executed a power of attorney in favor of her husband. Thereafter, Mr. Dillard executed a deed to himself. In affirming the trial court's ruling that voided the deed, we noted 1) that because the power of attorney did not expressly grant Mr. Dillard the authority to execute a deed to himself, he did not have the power to do so, and 2) that Mrs. Dillard's intent was obviously to retain the property, because, had she intended to give him the property, she could have executed the deed herself at the time she executed the power of attorney. Dillard v. Gill, 231 Ala. at 665, 166 So. at 433.

Lamb and Heliste argue that the issue of the validity of the deed as to Heliste cannot be properly disposed of on a motion for summary judgment, because, they say, Dollie's intent is a genuine issue of material fact. However, Dollie's intention was clearly expressed almost exactly a year after she executed the power of attorney, when she executed her will leaving all her property to Lamb, Heliste, and Scott, equally. Because Dollie's intent was to leave her property to Lamb, Heliste, and Scott, equally, Lamb was without the power to deed the property to Heliste. Dillard v. Gill, 231 Ala. at 665, 166 So. at 433. One who accepts a power of attorney covenants to use the power for the sole benefit of the one conferring the power and to use it in a manner consistent with the purposes of the agency relationship created by the power of attorney. Sevigny v. New South Federal Savings Loan Ass'n, 586 So.2d at 886.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

AFFIRMED.

HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, STEAGALL and INGRAM, JJ., concur.