Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The evidence adduced at the hearing supported the Family Court's finding that the husband's nonpayment of support pursuant to the July 3, 1991 support order resulted from willfulness rather than an inability to pay (see, Family Ct Act § 454). Despite the fact that the husband was regularly employed during the period in question, he made no support payments whatsoever and did not attempt to modify the order of support, both of which facts constitute prima facie evidence of willfulness (see, Matter of Sands v. Sands, 105 A.D.2d 788; Matter of Dickstein v Dickstein, 99 A.D.2d 929). In addition, the ownership of real estate itself can provide prima facie proof of a person's ability to pay (see, Matter of Grasso v. Saidel, 150 A.D.2d 916, 918). Having properly concluded that the husband's failure to abide by the order of support was willful, under the circumstances of this case commitment pursuant to Family Court Act § 454 (3) (a) was entirely proper (see, Edwards v. Edwards, 122 A.D.2d 18). Mangano, P.J., Balletta, O'Brien, Hart and Florio, JJ., concur.