PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of resisting and obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.479; MSA 28.747. He also pleaded guilty of operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, MCL 257.625(1); MSA 9.2325(1), and of being an habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082. Defendant was sentenced to serve one hundred days in jail and five years' probation for the resisting and obstructing conviction, along with a concurrent term of ninety days in jail and two years' probation for the OUIL conviction. Defendant appeals as of right, contending that his conviction for resisting and obstructing a police officer should be vacated. We disagree and affirm.
Relying on People v Landrie, 124 Mich. App. 480; 335 N.W.2d 11 (1983), and People v Strelow, 96 Mich. App. 182; 292 N.W.2d 517 (1980), defendant contends that his conviction is invalid because mere prearrest flight from a police officer is insufficient to establish the offense of resisting and obstructing. Unlike in Landrie, however, defendant's flight in this case actively interfered with a deputy sheriff's traffic stop and investigation of drunk driving. Additionally, unlike the defendant in Strelow, defendant here knew that he was fleeing from the scene of a crime. Although defendant did not physically obstruct the officer, he did engage in conduct that under all the circumstances hindered an officer conducting a police investigation — a police function covered by the resisting and obstructing statute. People v King, 236 Mich. 405; 210 N.W. 235 (1926); People v Kelley, 78 Mich. App. 769; 260 N.W.2d 923 (1977); People v Weatherspoon, 6 Mich. App. 229; 148 N.W.2d 889 (1967). Accordingly, defendant's conviction was proper.
Affirmed.