Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court did not improvidently limit the defense counsel's cross-examination of a prosecution witness. It is well settled that the nature and extent of cross-examination are matters subject to the sound discretion of the trial court (see, People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, cert denied 396 U.S. 846). The areas on which the defense counsel wished to cross-examine the witness were only collateral to the trial and of limited relevance (see, People v Johnson, 61 N.Y.2d 932, 933-934; People v. Hulbert, 183 A.D.2d 849; People v. Quinones, 182 A.D.2d 581).
The propriety of the court's ruling in precluding the defense from introducing evidence of the victims' criminal records or reputation for violence in the community is not preserved for appellate review, since the defendant's theory on appeal for its admission that the People had "opened the door" (People v Melendez, 55 N.Y.2d 445, 451), was not advanced at trial (see, People v. Johnson, 61 N.Y.2d 932, 934, supra).
The defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Thompson, J.P., Sullivan, Altman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.