Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
It is well settled that the court, in its discretion, may grant an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim (see, General Municipal Law § 50-e). The key factors which the court must consider are whether the petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in maintaining its defense on the merits (see, Matter of Townsend v. New York City Hous. Auth., 194 A.D.2d 795; Carbone v. Town of Brookhaven, 176 A.D.2d 778; Braverman v. City of White Plains, 115 A.D.2d 689).
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, that the County had knowledge of the facts constituting his claim because its personnel were present at the accident site, what satisfies the statute is not knowledge of the alleged wrong, but rather, knowledge of the nature of the claim (see, Thomann v. City of Rochester, 256 N.Y. 165). A police report describing an accident which fails to state any connection between the accident and the condition complained of, does not give rise to notice of the petitioner's claim of negligence on the part of the municipality (see, Caselli v. City of New York, 105 A.D.2d 251).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the petitioner's application for leave to serve a late notice of claim (see, Matter of Kyser v. New York City Hous. Auth., 178 A.D.2d 601; Ortega v. New York City Hous. Auth., 167 A.D.2d 337; Kissell v. County of Erie, 138 A.D.2d 965). Bracken, J.P., Balletta, Copertino and Hart, JJ., concur.