SCHUMAN v. STATE

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Docket Number

S94G0929.

Attorney(S)

Michael K. McIntyre, for appellant. J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Thomas S. Clegg, Assistant District Attorney, Garland, Samuel Loeb, Donald F. Samuel, for appellee.

Judges

HUNT, Chief Justice.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from an indictment charging Schuman with theft by deception and theft by taking. The trial court initially dismissed the indictment pretrial following a hearing that included argument and a summary of evidence by both parties. The Court of Appeals reversed that dismissal, prompting the Supreme Court of Georgia to grant certiorari to review whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's pretrial dismissal of the indictment against Schuman.
Whether a trial court may properly dismiss an indictment after conducting a hearing on a motion to dismiss that includes consideration of facts outside the indictment, when such procedure is agreed to by the parties.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Schuman challenged the indictment through a "speaking demurrer," which introduced facts beyond the indictment's face.
Argued that the trial court's dismissal following a summary of evidence was appropriate under the procedure agreed upon by the parties.

Appellee's Arguments

The State agreed to submit the case to the trial court to determine if it could meet its burden of proof but contended it did not agree to submit the question of criminal intent.
The State conceded the validity of the procedure used but disputed the scope of what was submitted for determination, specifically regarding intent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
State v. Schuman, 212 Ga. App. 231 (441 S.E.2d 466) (1994)	Review of Court of Appeals' reversal of trial court's dismissal of indictment.	Determined that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
Ga. Crim. Trial Practice (1993 ed.), § 14-20	Speaking demurrer generally presents no authority for quashing an indictment and is void.	Supported the conclusion that the trial court's dismissal based on facts outside the indictment was procedurally improper absent agreement.
Jackson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 391, 392 (1), 430 S.E.2d 781 (1993)	No authority for converting a motion to dismiss hearing into a summary judgment hearing on stipulated facts.	Noted that the trial court's procedure was generally unauthorized but recognized the parties' consent altered the analysis.
State v. Finkelstein, 170 Ga. App. 608 (1), 317 S.E.2d 648 (1984)	Trial court's discretion to hold a hearing by consent of the parties.	Supported the trial court's discretion to decide the motion to dismiss in the manner agreed to by the parties.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court acknowledged that Schuman's motion to dismiss was a "speaking demurrer," which generally cannot serve as a basis for quashing an indictment because it introduces facts not on the indictment's face. The trial court's dismissal followed a hearing resembling a summary judgment proceeding on stipulated facts, a procedure for which there is no standard authority. However, because the State expressly consented to this procedure, including submission of the entire case and the question of criminal intent, the trial court did not err in proceeding as it did. The Court thus reversed the Court of Appeals, which had found error in the dismissal, and remanded for the Court of Appeals to determine whether the trial court properly dismissed the indictment under the stipulated facts. The Court emphasized that holding such a hearing by consent is within the trial court’s discretion and that no statutory prohibition exists against this procedure.

Holding and Implications

Judgment reversed and case remanded.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's dismissal of the indictment. Because the parties agreed to the procedure used by the trial court, the dismissal was not improper. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals to evaluate the dismissal under the stipulated facts. This decision clarifies that while a speaking demurrer typically cannot justify dismissal, parties may consent to alternative procedures, and courts have discretion to proceed accordingly. No new precedent was established beyond the recognition of the trial court’s discretion when the parties agree to the procedure.

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SCHUMAN v. THE STATE.

HUNT, Chief Justice.

We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in State v. Schuman, 212 Ga. App. 231 ( 441 S.E.2d 466) (1994) to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's pretrial dismissal of the indictment charging Schuman with theft by deception and theft by taking. We hold that the Court of Appeals did so err, and reverse and remand.

The Court of Appeals correctly noted that Schuman's motion to dismiss the indictment was a "speaking demurrer," which added facts not appearing on the face of the indictment. See Ga. Crim. Trial Practice (1993 ed.), § 14-20. Generally, such a demurrer presents no authority for quashing an indictment and is void. Id. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the trial court, in dismissing the indictment following argument and a summary of the evidence by both parties, converted the hearing on Schuman's motion to dismiss into what would be, in civil practice, a summary judgment hearing on stipulated facts. There is no authority for this procedure. Jackson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 391, 392 (1) ( 430 S.E.2d 781) (1993).

However, it is clear from the record that the state agreed to the procedure used by the trial court. There is no statutory proscription against this procedure, and, under the circumstances, the trial court did not err in deciding Schuman's motion in the manner agreed to by the parties. See State v. Finkelstein, 170 Ga. App. 608 (1) ( 317 S.E.2d 648) (1984). Accordingly, this appeal is remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine whether, under the facts stipulated by the parties, the trial court properly dismissed the indictment.

While the state concedes that it agreed to submit the case to the trial court for the court to determine if the state would be able to meet its burden of proof, and agrees with Schuman that this is a valid procedure, the state contends it did not agree to submit the question of criminal intent to the trial court. However, the record shows that the state agreed to submit its entire case, including the question of intent, for the trial court to determine whether the underlying dispute should be resolved in a criminal or civil forum.

To hold such a hearing by consent of the parties is within the trial court's discretion.

Judgment reversed and case remanded. All the Justices concur, except Sears-Collins, J., who concurs in the judgment only.