Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
There is no merit to the defendant's contention that the conviction of kidnapping in the second degree should be reversed because of the doctrine of merger. The restraint of the victim at gunpoint for over an hour, after the defendant committed a robbery and was attempting to escape but was hindered by the arrival of the police, constituted the discrete and independent crime of kidnapping in the second degree, and was not incidental to the robbery charge (see, People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146; People v. Smith, 47 N.Y.2d 83; People v. Addison, 151 A.D.2d 372).
The defendant's challenge to the prosecutor's remarks during summation is not preserved for appellate review and, in any event, is without merit.
Finally, the defendant's sentence was not excessive. Rosenblatt, J.P., Ritter, Copertino and Florio, JJ., concur.