Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Patterson v. Kleiman, Docket No. 96831 (Mich. Sup. Ct. Nov. 15, 1994) — Structured Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff's decedent was a long-time resident of the Northville Regional Psychiatric Hospital. He suffered a seizure on February 6, 1989, was taken to St. Mary Hospital in Livonia, and died. The plaintiff sued two physicians at Northville, alleging they were responsible for the faulty insertion of an endotracheal tube that led to the decedent's death.

The defendants moved for summary disposition under three separate subsections of MCR 2.116: (C)(7) (governmental immunity), (C)(8) (failure to state a claim), and (C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). The defendants supported their motion with affidavits asserting they had not been involved in insertion of such a tube. The plaintiff opposed the motion with (1) a physician's letter opining that insertion had been grossly negligent, and (2) an emergency room report offered to support the plaintiff's allegation that the tube was inserted before arrival at St. Mary Hospital.

The circuit court granted the motion for summary disposition, finding the defendants immune. The Court of Appeals reversed that dismissal (199 Mich. App. 191; 500 N.W.2d 761 (1993)) and later denied rehearing by unpublished order. The defendants applied to the Michigan Supreme Court for leave to appeal; the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave, affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment and clarified the proper analysis for a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7). A dissenting justice would have granted leave to appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendants were immune from suit under governmental immunity such that summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) was appropriate.
  2. What is the proper manner for a trial court to consider a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) when affidavits, pleadings, and other documentary evidence have been submitted by the parties?
  3. Whether dismissal of the plaintiff's claims at the stage before trial was appropriate given the conflicting affidavits and documentary materials submitted in opposition to the defendants' motion.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff alleged in the complaint that the defendants improperly and unwisely inserted an endotracheal tube and that this conduct directly resulted in the decedent's death.
  • In opposition to the defendants' motion, the plaintiff submitted a physician's letter asserting the insertion was grossly negligent and an emergency room report tending to show the tube had been inserted before arrival at St. Mary Hospital.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants moved for summary disposition on three grounds: governmental immunity under MCR 2.116(C)(7), failure to state a claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8), and lack of any genuine issue of material fact under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
  • They supported their motion with affidavits swearing that they had not been involved in insertion of an endotracheal tube—essentially denying the factual allegations that connected them to the alleged wrongful conduct and asserting immunity.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Haywood v. Fowler, 190 Mich. App. 253; 475 N.W.2d 458 (1991) Two principles attributed: (1) when considering a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) courts consider affidavits, pleadings, and other documentary evidence; (2) courts must consider well-pleaded allegations as true and construe them most favorably to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court observed both principles are accurately attributed to Haywood and discussed the practical tension when affidavits contradict complaint allegations; Haywood's principles were cited as the starting point for the analytical clarification.
Marrero v. McDonnell Douglas Capital Corp., 200 Mich. App. 438; 505 N.W.2d 275 (1993) Cited as supporting one or both of the principles associated with Haywood in published Court of Appeals decisions. Listed as an example of published decisions where the same principles have appeared; cited to show supporting authority in the Court of Appeals' body of decisions.
Simmons v. Apex Drug Stores, Inc., 201 Mich. App. 250; 506 N.W.2d 562 (1993) Cited as supporting the principles articulated in Haywood. Used as another published example supporting the Court of Appeals' approach to (C)(7) motions and pleadings.
Jones v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 202 Mich. App. 393; 509 N.W.2d 829 (1993) Cited as supporting the principles articulated in Haywood. Included among cases showing the published support for the dual principles about consideration of materials and pleading-construction.
Skotak v. Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc., 203 Mich. App. 616; 513 N.W.2d 429 (1994) Cited as supporting the principles articulated in Haywood. Cited as part of the body of Court of Appeals decisions reflecting the same approach.
Wade v. Dep't of Corrections, 439 Mich. 158; 483 N.W.2d 26 (1992) Cited as related authority; referenced in the same footnote cluster as other supporting decisions. Listed as additional authority in the discussion of how courts have treated motions and supporting materials.
Montgomery v. Detroit, 181 Mich. App. 298; 448 N.W.2d 822 (1989) Cited in a comparison to demonstrate divergent approaches among Court of Appeals decisions. Included in a list of opinions contrasted with others to illustrate that the practical effect of the maxims can be contradictory.
Chivas v. Koehler, 182 Mich. App. 467; 453 N.W.2d 264 (1990) Cited in comparison to show differing applications of the principles. Used to illustrate variance among Court of Appeals decisions regarding treatment of motions and supporting materials.
Harrison v. Director of Dep't of Corrections, 194 Mich. App. 446; 487 N.W.2d 799 (1992) Cited in comparison to show differing applications of the principles. Displayed as part of the contrasting authorities reflecting nonuniform approaches.
Mollett v. City of Taylor, 197 Mich. App. 328; 494 N.W.2d 832 (1992) Cited as part of contrasting authorities that take a different approach to motion practice. Quoted among cases that present a different practical effect from other authorities.
Brownell v. Garber, 199 Mich. App. 519; 503 N.W.2d 81 (1993) Cited among contrasting Court of Appeals decisions. Listed to show the lack of uniformity in application of the maxims.
Diversified Financial Systems, Inc. v. Schanhals, 203 Mich. App. 589; 513 N.W.2d 210 (1994) Cited among contrasting authorities. Included to illustrate differing outcomes in Court of Appeals' motion-practice jurisprudence.
Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, Inc., 439 Mich. 512; 486 N.W.2d 612 (1992) Cited for the proposition that MCR 2.116(G)(5) requires the court to consider affidavits and supplementary papers submitted by the parties. Relied upon to support the Supreme Court's statement that all submitted supporting and opposing materials must be considered by the court when applicable.
Court of Appeals decision reversing the circuit court, 199 Mich. App. 191; 500 N.W.2d 761 (1993) The intermediate appellate judgment reversing the trial court's dismissal under governmental immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and clarified the analysis applicable to MCR 2.116(C)(7) motions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court's per curiam opinion focused on clarifying the proper analysis for a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (governmental immunity) when the motion is supported or opposed by affidavits and other documentary materials. The Court emphasized that motions under MCR 2.116 differ depending on the subsection invoked, and the treatment of supporting or opposing material depends on that subsection:

  • MCR 2.116(C)(7): A movant may support the motion with affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence (MCR 2.116(G)(3)); if such material is submitted, the court must consider it (MCR 2.116(G)(5)). The movant is not required to file supporting material, and the opposing party is not required to respond in kind, but the contents of the complaint must be accepted as true unless specifically contradicted by affidavits or other appropriate documentation submitted by the movant.
  • MCR 2.116(C)(8): A motion for failure to state a claim may not be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence; the court must rely only on the pleadings (MCR 2.116(G)(2); (G)(5)).
  • MCR 2.116(C)(10): A motion under this subsection must be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence (MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b)), and the adverse party may not rest on mere allegations of the pleading but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial (MCR 2.116(G)(4)); all supporting and opposing material must be considered (MCR 2.116(G)(5)).

The Court observed a practical tension: Haywood and other decisions have stated both that a court considering a (C)(7) motion should (1) consider all submitted affidavits and documentary evidence and (2) treat well-pleaded allegations as true and construe them in the plaintiff's favor. These two principles can conflict when a movant's affidavits directly contradict the complaint. The Court resolved this tension by clarifying that:

  • The movant under (C)(7) may submit affidavits and other documentary evidence, and if such material is submitted it must be considered by the court.
  • The complaint's allegations are to be accepted as true except to the extent they are specifically contradicted by the movant's properly submitted affidavits or other appropriate documentation.
  • Because the defendants in this case submitted sworn denials that they performed or were responsible for inserting the endotracheal tube, and the plaintiff submitted documentation supporting her allegation that the defendants were responsible, the trial and appellate courts properly reviewed all submitted materials rather than relying solely on the complaint.

Applying these principles to the record, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that dismissal at that stage was inappropriate because the lower courts properly considered the competing materials and it was not appropriate to dismiss plaintiff's claims on the record presented.

Holding and Implications

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Direct consequences and implications drawn by the Court from the opinion (as stated in the text):

  • The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the circuit court's grant of summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity.
  • The decision clarifies the proper analysis for a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7): when affidavits or other documentary evidence are submitted in support of or opposition to the motion, the court must consider those materials, and the complaint's allegations remain accepted as true only to the extent they are not specifically contradicted by such materials.
  • The opinion emphasizes that all submitted supporting and opposing material must be reviewed when applicable (citing MCR 2.116(G)(5) and Neibarger), and that a (C)(7) movant is not required to submit supporting material but may do so.
  • No new rule beyond this clarification was announced; the Court confirmed the Court of Appeals' approach and remanded the practical result that dismissal was improper at that stage. The primary effect is procedural clarification for the consideration of governmental immunity motions under MCR 2.116(C)(7).
  • One justice dissented, expressing the view that leave to appeal should have been granted to allow fuller briefing and input from the bar before issuing a per curiam decision affecting motion practice statewide; another justice joined that dissent.

This summary is based exclusively on the opinion provided. If information that might normally appear in a full opinion (such as detailed factual development at trial or additional party briefs) was not present in the provided text, it has not been added or inferred.

PATTERSON v KLEIMAN

PER CURIAM.

This is a medical malpractice case in which the circuit court granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), but the Court of Appeals reversed. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but clarify the proper analysis of a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7).

I

The plaintiff's decedent was a long-time resident of the Northville Regional Psychiatric Hospital. He suffered a seizure on February 6, 1989, and was taken to St. Mary Hospital in Livonia, where he died.

The plaintiff filed suit against two physicians at Northville, alleging that they were responsible for the faulty insertion of an endotracheal tube. The defendants responded with a motion for summary disposition. The motion was supported by the defendants' affidavits in which they swore that they had not been involved in the insertion of such a tube.

The plaintiff's answer to the motion was supported by two documents. One was a physician's letter in which he offered the opinion that the tube had been inserted in a manner that was grossly negligent. The second was an emergency room report that the plaintiff submitted to support her allegation that the disputed tube had been inserted before the decedent's arrival at St. Mary Hospital.

The circuit court granted the motion for summary disposition, finding the defendants immune. The Court of Appeals reversed. 199 Mich. App. 191; 500 N.W.2d 761 (1993). The defendants have applied to this Court for leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeals later denied rehearing. Unpublished order issued May 25, 1993 (Docket No. 134858).

II

The defendants' motion for summary disposition was filed under three separate paragraphs of MCR 2.116(C). The defendants said that they were immune from suit. MCR 2.116(C)(7). They also said that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. MCR 2.116(C)(8). Finally, they asserted that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10).

The requirements for a motion for summary disposition and the manner in which such a motion is considered by the trial court vary, depending on the nature of the motion. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) may be supported by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(3). If such material is submitted to the court, it must be considered. MCR 2.116(G)(5).

A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may not be supported by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(2). When considering such a motion, the trial court must rely only on the pleadings. MCR 2.116(G)(5).

A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) must be supported by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b). The adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of a pleading, but must, by affidavits or other appropriate means, set forth specific facts to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. MCR 2.116(G)(4). All this supporting and opposing material must be considered by the court. MCR 2.116(G)(5).

As noted above, the defendants' motion was filed under all three paragraphs. However, the circuit court expressly granted summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity. Thus the summary disposition in this case was rendered under MCR 2.116(C)(7).

Whether the defendants actually were involved in the insertion of an endotracheal tube, and whether they did so in a manner that was grossly negligent, are questions that affect both their immunity to suit, MCR 2.116(C)(7), and their possible entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, MCR 2.116(C)(10). That is because, as governmental employees, they are ordinarily immune from suit for actions that do not involve gross negligence. MCL 691.1407(2)(c); MSA 3.996(107)(2)(c).

III

The Court of Appeals has reversed the summary disposition entered by the circuit court. We affirm that result. However, it is necessary to clarify the Court of Appeals analysis.

At one point in its discussion, the Court of Appeals stated:

When considering a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7), we consider all the affidavits, pleadings, and other documentary evidence filed or submitted by the parties. Haywood v Fowler, 190 Mich. App. 253, 255-256; 475 N.W.2d 458 (1991). We must consider all well-pleaded allegations as true and construe them most favorably to the plaintiff. Id. [ 199 Mich. App. 192-193.]

Those two principles are accurately attributed to Haywood, and they have been presented together in other decisions, as well. Likewise, each leg of Haywood finds support in the published decisions of the Court of Appeals.

See, e.g., Marrero v McDonnell Douglas Capital Corp, 200 Mich. App. 438, 440-441; 505 N.W.2d 275 (1993); Simmons v Apex Drug Stores, Inc, 201 Mich. App. 250, 252; 506 N.W.2d 562 (1993); Jones v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 202 Mich. App. 393, 396-397; 509 N.W.2d 829 (1993); Skotak v Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc, 203 Mich. App. 616, 617; 513 N.W.2d 429 (1994). See also Wade v Dep't of Corrections, 439 Mich. 158, 162-163; 483 N.W.2d 26 (1992).

Compare Montgomery v Detroit, 181 Mich. App. 298, 302-303; 448 N.W.2d 822 (1989), Chivas v Koehler, 182 Mich. App. 467, 471; 453 N.W.2d 264 (1990), and Harrison v Director of Dep't of Corrections, 194 Mich. App. 446, 449; 487 N.W.2d 799 (1992), with Mollett v City of Taylor, 197 Mich. App. 328, 332-333; 494 N.W.2d 832 (1992), Brownell v Garber, 199 Mich. App. 519, 529; 503 N.W.2d 81 (1993), and Diversified Financial Systems, Inc v Schanhals, 203 Mich. App. 589, 591; 513 N.W.2d 210 (1994).

However, the practical effect of these maxims often is directly contradictory. If, as in the present case, the defendants submit affidavits that contradict the allegations of the complaint, it is not possible to honor fully both rules — the circuit court cannot simultaneously consider all well-pleaded allegations as true and give meaningful consideration to the additional papers filed to support and oppose the motion.

In the present case, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that her decedent died as the direct result of the defendants improperly and unwisely inserting an endotracheal tube. The defendants then filed affidavits saying, in essence, that the plaintiff sued the wrong defendants — they never inserted such a tube or caused anyone else to insert it. The plaintiff responded with documentation to support her claim that the defendants were the persons responsible for her decedent's death.

As noted in n 2, this denial could be used to support summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no wrongful conduct at all) or under 2.116(C)(7) (no gross negligence, hence governmental immunity).

If a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) were considered in the same manner as a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8), the defendants' sworn denials and the plaintiff's responsive documentation would be of no account, since the court would be required simply to treat the allegations of the complaint as true. However, MCR 2.116(G)(5) provides that the court must consider the affidavits and other supplementary papers filed by the parties. Neibarger v Universal Cooperatives, Inc, 439 Mich. 512, 532, n 29; 486 N.W.2d 612 (1992). Thus, all these materials were properly considered by the courts below.

A party who files a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) must support the motion with affidavits or other appropriate documentation, MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b), and the adverse party may not rest upon the pleadings, MCR 2.116(G)(4). The difference between a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is that a movant under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is not required to file supportive material, and the party opposing the motion is not required to respond in kind. Moreover, the contents of the complaint must be accepted as true unless specifically contradicted by the affidavits or other appropriate documentation submitted by the movant.

In this case, the Court of Appeals properly reviewed all the material submitted in support of, and in opposition to, the plaintiff's claim, and correctly determined that "it was not appropriate to have dismissed plaintiff's claims at this stage in the proceedings." 199 Mich. App. 193.

With clarification of the proper manner for consideration of a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. MCR 7.302(F)(1).

CAVANAGH, C.J., and LEVIN, RILEY, BRICKLEY, and MALLETT, JJ., concurred.

BOYLE, J. (dissenting).

The rationale of the per curiam opinion seems to be that "what was, is."

I would grant leave to appeal to allow the profession to educate the members of the Court on how or why the Michigan rule and its apparent adherence to a nonunified approach to motion practice is superior to the approach under FR Civ P 12(b), 12(c), and 56. In my view, it is ill-advised to issue a per curiam decision that affects every civil case in our state without input from the practicing bar and an invitation for briefs amici curiae from the trial judiciary.

BRICKLEY, J., concurred with BOYLE, J.

Use AI to get other relevant cases.

Comments

PATTERSON v. KLEIMAN
(Nov 15, 1994)