Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's claim that his conviction for kidnapping in the second degree should be reversed because of the merger doctrine is unpreserved for appellate review (see, People v. Sage, 204 A.D.2d 746). In any event, the defendant's restraint of his victim was of the sort which the Legislature intended to punish separately from the other crimes which he committed (see, People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 152). Contrary to the defendant's claim, the abduction was discrete from the burglary as the latter crime had been fully completed when the defendant forced the victim at knifepoint into a car and drove for 30 minutes before she was able to make her escape (see, People v. Smith, 47 N.Y.2d 83, 87).
We find that the sentence imposed was appropriate under the circumstances of this case (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Sullivan, J.P., Rosenblatt, Pizzuto and Altman, JJ., concur.