Defendant contends that the jury charge on reasonable doubt impermissibly shifted the burden of proof. The charge, viewed as a whole, conveyed the proper standard. The court's singular statement that the jurors " must be in a position to furnish their reason if asked to do so" by a fellow juror, did not impose an "affirmative obligation" on the jurors "to supply concrete reasons `based upon the evidence' for [an] inclination to acquit" (People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247, 251, 252), "and in no way reduced the People's burden of proof" (People v Johnson, 196 A.D.2d 765, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 926). Nor do we find error in the court's description of reasonable doubt as a doubt that would make a "reasonable person * * * hesitate to act" (see, People v. Quinones, 123 A.D.2d 793).
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Rosenberger, Nardelli and Williams, JJ.