WILSON, J.
On October 19, 1988 the employee, while making a delivery in the scope of his employment, suffered an injury when he dropped a heavy object on his right ankle. INA/CIGNA Insurance Companies paid compensation benefits until early 1989, when the employee returned to work. Subsequent to the employee's return, he treated with several physicians for pain and swelling in his ankle. On October 30, 1991, the employee suffered another injury to the same ankle. CNA Insurance Companies insured the employer at the time of the 1991 injury. The employee underwent surgery to his right ankle on December 3, 1991, and has not returned to work since the second injury date. The employee filed claims against both insurers.
The administrative judge issued a conference order requiring CNA to pay compensation benefits for the period of October 30, 1991 through October 5, 1992. The claim against CIGNA was denied. After a hearing, the administrative judge rendered an opinion granting weekly incapacity benefits under § 34 from October 30, 1991 through December 3, 1991 to be paid by CNA, and 34 benefits from December 3, 1991 through September 30, 1992 to be paid by CIGNA. In addition, the administrative judge awarded partial incapacity benefits under § 35 from October 1, 1992 through January 19, 1993 to be paid by CIGNA. The employee appeals that decision.
"It is the settled duty of the hearing judge to make such specific and definite findings based upon the evidence reported as will enable this board to determine with reasonable certainty whether correct rules of law have been applied." Crowell v. New Penn Motor Express, 7 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 3, 4 (1993) (citing Zucchi's Case, 310 Mass. 130, 133 (1941)). In this case, the administrative judge satisfied this requirement.
The administrative judge found that the employee sustained personal injuries arising within the scope of his employment on October 19, 1988 and on October 30, 1991. (Dec. 18). The medical opinions of Dr. Ready and Dr. Thrasher were adopted in part by the administrative judge in his determination that the employee was totally incapacitated from October 30, 1991 through September 30, 1992. (Dec. 16, 19). It is well within the administrative judge's authority to adopt part, all or none of the testimony presented by a medical expert. Amon's Case, 315 Mass. 210 (1943). The administrative judge found that, based on Dr. Thrasher's testimony, the surgery was causally related to the 1988 injury (Dec. 12-13, 15, 19) (Dep. of Dr. Thrasher, pp. 14-15, 23-24, 41-42), and that the total incapacity from October 30, 1991 through December 3, 1991 was causally related to the second injury. (Dec. 19) (Dep. of Dr. Thrasher, pp. 32, 40).
Dr. Ready pointed out that restrictions were placed on the employee as of September 30, 1992 based on his pain pattern. (Dep. of Dr. Ready, pp. 19-20). Adopting that testimony, the administrative judge determined that the employee had an earning capacity of $250.00 per week between September 30, 1992 and January 19, 1993. (Dec. 16, 19). Adopting the medical testimony of the impartial physician, who examined the employee on January 19, 1993, the administrative judge stated, "it is clear from Dr. Cater's testimony that the Employee is able to engage in significant physical activity and I am convinced that the employee is fully capable of earning his average weekly wage." (Dec. 17) ( See Dep. of Dr. Cater, pp. 10-12). We are satisfied that the judge's findings and the record support the ultimate conclusions.
The administrative judge, however, determined "that vocational rehabilitation is not warranted in this case." (Dec. 20). This was error. "[A]ny entitlement of this employee to vocational rehabilitation shall be resolved . . . through the Office of Education and Vocational Rehabilitation. . . ." Jones v. Bob Weiner Tire Co., 2 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 265, 268 (1988). A determination of suitability for vocational rehabilitation was not for the administrative judge to determine and we strike that portion of the decision as beyond the scope of his authority. G.L.c. 152, § 11C. The decision is affirmed in all other respects.
So ordered.
Judges Fischel and McCarthy concur.