Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Supreme Court properly denied the motion of defendant to suppress the weapon found in her automobile. The initial police stop of her automobile was proper because the officer had a reasonable belief that defendant was violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1229-c (3) (see, People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 420; People v. Ramos, 161 A.D.2d 198, 199-200; People v. Phillips, 159 A.D.2d 326; People v Hines, 155 A.D.2d 722, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 736).
Before defendant stopped her automobile, the police officer observed the passenger turn around and act in a manner suggesting that the passenger was attempting to conceal something in the backseat. After defendant stopped her automobile, the police officer noticed the cushion of the backseat pulled away and observed "a pipe that was sticking out from under the seat which appeared to be the barrel of a gun." Under the circumstances, the officer had "information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that * * * evidence of a crime may be found in a certain place [citations omitted]" (People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423; see, People v. Fulton, 189 A.D.2d 778, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 1014; People v. Vaneiken, 166 A.D.2d 308; People v. Paone, 103 A.D.2d 1012). "It was the probable cause to believe a gun was in the car that gave the police officers grounds for the search of the car" (People v. Ellis, 62 N.Y.2d 393, 397; see, People v. Blasich, 73 N.Y.2d 673).