Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Motions for reargument are addressed to the sound discretion of the court which decided the prior motion and may be granted upon a showing that the court overlooked or misapprehended the facts or law or for some reason mistakenly arrived at its earlier decision (see, Rodney v. New York Pyrotechnic Prods. Co., 112 A.D.2d 410, 411). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motion to reargue.
In this instance, the plaintiff is not precluded from suing his employer for negligence pursuant to the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 688) simply because he has received compensation benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ( 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.), provided that, as in this case, he is a "member of a crew of any vessel," a phrase that is a refinement of the term "seaman" in the Jones Act (see, Southwest Mar. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 85; McDermott Intl. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 347). The Supreme Court properly denied the appellant's motion for summary judgment since it failed to establish as a matter of law that the barge which supported the pile-driving crane, upon which the plaintiff was injured, did not constitute a "vessel" pursuant to the Jones Act (see, Sharp v. Johnson Bros. Corp., 917 F.2d 885; Brunet v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 715 F.2d 196; Bongiovanni v N.V. Stoomvaart-Mats "Oostzee", 458 F. Supp. 602). Bracken, J.P., Balletta, Copertino and Hart, JJ., concur.