Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The appellants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint arguing, inter alia, that, pursuant to New York's borrowing statute, the three-year Statute of Limitations of the District of Columbia bars the plaintiff's causes of action (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [5]; 202; DC Code 1981 § 12-301). The Supreme Court properly declined to determine the merits of this defense, i.e., whether the causes of action accrued in the District of Columbia, since there was insufficient evidence before it to make such a determination (see, CPLR 202; State of N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v. Starr, 158 A.D.2d 771; see also, Martin v. Dierck Equip. Co., 52 A.D.2d 463, 466, affd 43 N.Y.2d 583). In any event, even assuming that the causes of action accrued in the District of Columbia, the appellants failed to demonstrate their amenability to jurisdiction there (see, Rescildo v. Macy's, 155 A.D.2d 379; see also, State of N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v. Starr, 158 A.D.2d 771, supra).
The Supreme Court properly determined that the amended complaint states a cause of action against the appellants (see, CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; see also, Santulli v. Englert, Reilly McHugh, 78 N.Y.2d 700, 707, 709; Gordon v. De Laurentiis Corp., 141 A.D.2d 435, 436; Reade v. Sullivan, 259 App. Div. 229).
In light of these determinations, we decline to address the parties' remaining contentions. Sullivan, J.P., Rosenblatt, Copertino and Hart, JJ., concur.