Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
An evaluation of what constitutes reasonable counsel fees is a matter that is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court (see, DeCabrera v. Cabrera-Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879, 881; Matter of Aronesty v. Aronesty, 202 A.D.2d 240), which is often in the best position to judge those factors integral to the fixing of counsel fees (see, Lefkowitz v. Van Ess, 166 A.D.2d 556; Shrauger v. Shrauger, 146 A.D.2d 955, 956). We find no basis to conclude that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in fixing the counsel fees in this case. Balletta, J.P., Santucci, Altman and Hart, JJ., concur.