Ordered that the order dated February 22, 1994, is reversed, on the law, and the plaintiff's motion is denied; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated July 20, 1994, is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that the defendant is awarded one bill of costs.
The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion by suspending the plaintiff's pendente lite maintenance and child support obligations contained in a stipulation into which the parties had entered in open court (Lamberson v. Lamberson, 208 A.D.2d 601). The record reveals that the plaintiff's alleged economic hardship is premised upon the fact that he has been convicted of a crime and sentenced to several years imprisonment. Since the plaintiff's financial difficulty is the result of a self-created hardship, we find that he is not entitled to a suspension of his support obligations (see, Matter of Knights v Knights, 71 N.Y.2d 865, 866-867; Romanous v. Romanous, 181 A.D.2d 872, 873; see also, Anderson v. Anderson, 212 A.D.2d 492; Lamberson v. Lamberson, supra).
We agree with the Supreme Court that the parties' stipulation, which was intended to set forth their respective pendente lite obligations, is not a separation agreement within the meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 170 (6) for the purpose of granting the defendant a so-called conversion divorce (see, e.g., Stone v Stone, 45 A.D.2d 967). Thompson, J.P., Lawrence, Hart and Goldstein, JJ., concur.