Judge JOHNSON concurring.
Defendant was born on 26 October 1976. On 23 August 1993, defendant was indicted under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 (1993) for a crime against nature. According to the indictment, the alleged act occurred between January and December 1989. Defendant was either twelve or thirteen at the time of the alleged act. He was sixteen at the time of the indictment, and eighteen at the time of this appeal.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on 27 August 1993. During his arraignment hearing on 6 October 1993, defendant argued his motion, which was subsequently denied. Defendant petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari to review the trial court's order. We allowed the petition.
ARNOLD, Chief Judge.
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction where a delinquent juvenile commits a felony at age thirteen but turns sixteen before proceedings are instituted.
Jurisdiction in juvenile cases is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-523:
The [district] court has exclusive, original jurisdiction over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be delinquent . . . . For purposes of determining jurisdiction, the age of the juvenile . . . at the time of the alleged offense . . . governs.
G.S. § 7A-523(a) (1989). Furthermore, once the court obtains jurisdiction over a juvenile, jurisdiction continues "until terminated by order of the court or until he reaches his eighteenth birthday." G.S. § 7A-524 (1989).
These statutes have been applied most recently in State v. Lundberg, 104 N.C. App. 543, 410 S.E.2d 216 (1991) and In re Stedman, 305 N.C. 92, 286 S.E.2d 527 (1982). In Lundberg, the defendant was indicted at age twenty-three. Prosecution of the defendant was attempted in superior court for unlawful acts (arson) committed by defendant when he was thirteen and fifteen. Although this Court recognized that jurisdiction is determined under G.S. § 7A-523(a) by the defendant's age at the time of the offense, the Court concluded that the case at bar turned "not upon defendant's age at the time of the crime, but upon whether or not the defendant is entitled to the continued protection of the juvenile code at the present time." Lundberg, 104 N.C. App. at 545, 410 S.E.2d at 217. The Court further reasoned that because the district court's retention of jurisdiction terminates upon the juvenile's turning eighteen, the twenty-three-year-old defendant is no longer entitled to the protection evidenced by the Juvenile Code's enumerated purposes, such as balancing the needs and interests of the child, parents and society, and ensuring that juvenile offenders may remain in their homes. Id.; G.S. § 7A-516 (1989).
Similarly in Stedman, the defendant aged out of the district court's original jurisdiction upon turning eighteen at the time of his indictment for felonies occurring when he was age fifteen. Stedman, 305 N.C. 92, 286 S.E.2d 527. G.S. § 7A-524 terminated the jurisdiction of the district court over the juvenile and the subject matter of the juvenile petitions. Id.
In the instant case, defendant was only sixteen at the time of indictment for an offense he allegedly committed at age thirteen. We agree with defendant that, under the express language of G.S. § 7A-523, the district court possessed exclusive, original jurisdiction at the time of the offense, between January and December 1989. Pending this appeal, however, defendant turned eighteen on 26 October 1994, thus aging him out of the district court's jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter. Therefore, the issue of whether the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is moot because under both statutory and case law of this State, defendant is now an adult subject to the jurisdiction of superior court. In re Cowles, 108 N.C. App. 74, 422 S.E.2d 443 (1992).
Appeal dismissed.
Judges JOHNSON and MARTIN, D., concur.