Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the petition was not jurisdictionally defective. The supporting deposition set forth nonhearsay allegations establishing every element of each crime charged (see, Family Ct Act § 311.2). Additionally, the deposition was properly verified pursuant to CPL 100.30 (1) (b) (see, Matter of Michael FF., 210 A.D.2d 758; Matter of Kerwin C., 207 A.D.2d 890; Matter of Kurt EE., 199 A.D.2d 945, 946; Matter of Celeste S., 187 A.D.2d 274; see generally, Matter of Neftali D., 85 N.Y.2d 631).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the appellant's guilt of robbery in the second degree and grand larceny in the fourth degree beyond a reasonable doubt. The complainant and a witness testified that the appellant grabbed a chain from the complainant's neck. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the finding of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
We note that grand larceny in the fourth degree, based upon the theory that the property was "taken from the person" of the victim (Penal Law § 155.30), is not a lesser-included offense of robbery in the second degree (see, People v Cintron, 199 A.D.2d 526, 527).
The Family Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in ordering supervised probation rather than an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (see, Matter of Nikkia C., 187 A.D.2d 581, 582; Matter of Rufino M., 168 A.D.2d 385, 386).
We have reviewed the appellant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Miller, J.P., Pizzuto, Joy and Friedmann, JJ., concur.