Case Summary: In the Matter of the Estate of Edna M. Esberg, Deceased

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department — May 22, 1995. Appeal from the Surrogate's Court, Nassau County (Radigan, J.).

Factual and Procedural Background

The proceeding involves the will of Edna M. Esberg, executed on November 30, 1988. The proponent of the will is the attorney-draftsman who prepared the instrument. The objectants are the decedent's daughter and elder grandson. They raised four objections to the will: (1) undue execution, (2) lack of testamentary capacity, (3) undue influence, and (4) fraud. The matter was before the Appellate Division on appeal from a decree of the Surrogate's Court, Nassau County. The Appellate Division ordered that the decree be affirmed, with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the will was duly executed in accordance with the formal statutory requirements (undue execution).
Whether the decedent possessed the requisite testamentary capacity under EPTL 3-1.1 at the relevant times, including at execution.
Whether the proponent and his wife exerted undue influence over the decedent to procure the will.
Whether the will was procured by fraud.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Objectants') Arguments

They asserted four grounds of objection to the will: undue execution, lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and fraud.
They alleged that the proponent and his wife insinuated themselves into the decedent's life with the sinister purpose of procuring the proponent's nomination as executor and trustee.
Their submissions, as characterized by the court, consisted of conclusory and speculative evidence rather than proof sufficient to establish fraud or undue influence.

Respondent's (Proponent's) Arguments

The proponent relied on the formal execution and attestation of the will, including supervision of execution by the attorney-draftsman, which gives rise to a presumption of regularity.
The proponent asserted the decedent had testamentary capacity at all relevant times and knew the nature and extent of her property and the natural objects of her bounty.
The proponent disclosed the financial consequences of the testamentary arrangements to the decedent, undermining claims of undisclosed or fraudulent procurement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Matter of Kindberg, 207 N.Y. 220, 228	Presumption of regularity when an attorney-draftsman supervises a will's execution.	The court relied on this presumption and noted that the objectants did not submit evidence sufficient to overcome it, supporting the conclusion that the will was duly executed.
Matter of Cottrell, 95 N.Y. 329, 338	Presumption of regularity of execution under similar circumstances.	Used alongside Kindberg to support the presumption that the will's execution complied with statutory formalities.
Matter of Posner, 160 A.D.2d 943	Presumption of correct execution when attorney-draftsman is involved.	Included among authorities establishing the presumption that the will was properly executed and not rebutted by objectants.
Children's Aid Socy. v Loveridge, 70 N.Y. 387	Principle regarding the timing and assessment of testamentary capacity (capacity at the relevant times, including execution).	Cited to support the court's finding that the decedent possessed testamentary capacity at the moment of execution and at relevant times.
Matter of Halliday, 246 App. Div. 441	Authority on evaluating testamentary capacity at relevant times including execution.	Relied on to corroborate the conclusion that the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity under EPTL 3-1.1.
Matter of Kumstar, 66 N.Y.2d 691, 692	Standard that a testator must know the nature and extent of property and the natural objects of bounty.	Invoked to conclude the decedent knew the nature and extent of her property and the natural objects of her bounty, satisfying EPTL 3-1.1.
Matter of Atterbury, 173 A.D.2d 817	Principle relating to disclosure of financial consequences and its relevance to undue influence/fraud claims.	Cited to support the court's view that the proponent's full disclosure of financial consequences undermined the objectants' claims of undue influence or fraud.
Matter of Weinstock, 40 N.Y.2d 1	Referenced as a comparative authority concerning issues of influence or disclosure (cited with "cf.").	Noted by the court in connection with the disclosure analysis; cited as a comparative authority but the opinion primarily relied on Atterbury for the disclosure point.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate's Court decree after applying established statutory standards and precedent to each objection:

Undue execution: The court found the will was executed in compliance with the formal requirements of execution and attestation under the applicable statute (referencing EPTL 3-2.1). Because the attorney-draftsman supervised execution, the court invoked the presumption of regularity (see Matter of Kindberg, Matter of Cottrell, Matter of Posner). The objectants did not produce evidence sufficient to rebut that presumption, so the court rejected the undue-execution objection.
Testamentary capacity: Applying EPTL 3-1.1 and the authorities cited (e.g., Children's Aid Socy. v Loveridge; Matter of Halliday; Matter of Kumstar), the court concluded that at all relevant times, including the moment of execution, the decedent possessed the requisite testamentary capacity. The court noted she knew the nature and extent of her property and the natural objects of her bounty. Although she suffered physical infirmities and depression, the record showed she was able to attend to household and financial affairs in a normal manner, which supported capacity.
Undue influence and fraud: The court concluded the objectants failed to establish undue influence or fraud. The submissions were characterized as conclusory and speculative; they did not prove that the proponent and his wife insinuated themselves into the decedent’s life for the purpose of procuring the proponent's nomination as executor and trustee. Moreover, the court relied on the fact that the proponent fully disclosed the financial consequences of the arrangement to the decedent (citing Matter of Atterbury and cf. Matter of Weinstock) as undermining the claims of improper procurement.

Based on these analyses, the Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate's Court decree. The opinion notes concurrence by Mangano, P.J., Sullivan, Thompson and Friedmann, JJ.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The decree is affirmed, with costs.

Implications and consequences:

The appellate court rejected each of the objectants' four objections (undue execution, lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and fraud) based on the record and applicable authorities.
The proponent's supervised execution of the will gave rise to a presumption of regularity that the objectants did not overcome. The decedent was found to have had testamentary capacity, and the evidence of undue influence or fraud was deemed conclusory and speculative. The proponent's disclosure of financial consequences further undercut the objectants' claims.
The direct effect is that the Surrogate's Court decree (as to which the appeal was taken) stands affirmed and the objectants' challenges were unsuccessful; costs were awarded to the proponent. The opinion does not announce any novel legal rule or broader precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts of this case.

Concurrence: Mangano, P.J., Sullivan, Thompson and Friedmann, JJ., concurred.

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In the Matter of the Estate of EDNA M. ESBERG, Deceased. JACK M. STEINGART, Respondent; ELISE MARENSON et al., Appellants.

Ordered that the decree is affirmed, with costs.

The proponent in this proceeding is the attorney-draftsman of a will executed by the decedent, Edna M. Esberg, on November 30, 1988. The objectants, the daughter and the elder grandson of the decedent, raise four objections to the will: undue execution, lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and fraud.

The record shows that the first objection lacks merit. The will was duly executed pursuant to the formal requirements of execution and attestation set forth in the applicable statute (see, EPTL 3-2.1). Moreover, when, as here, the attorney-draftsman supervised the will's execution, there is a presumption of regularity that the will was properly executed in all respects (see, e.g., Matter of Kindberg, 207 N.Y. 220, 228; Matter of Cottrell, 95 N.Y. 329, 338; Matter of Posner, 160 A.D.2d 943), and the objectants did not submit any evidence to overcome this presumption.

The record also shows that, at all relevant times including the moment of the will's execution (see, e.g., Children's Aid Socy. v Loveridge, 70 N.Y. 387; Matter of Halliday, 246 App. Div. 441), the decedent possessed the testamentary capacity required by EPTL 3-1.1 to make a will and to dispose of her property. She knew the nature and extent of her property and the natural objects of her bounty (see, Matter of Kumstar, 66 N.Y.2d 691, 692). Although she suffered from some physical infirmities and depression, she was able to attend to her household and financial affairs in a normal manner.

Finally, the objectants failed to establish their claims of fraud and undue influence. They submitted only conclusory and speculative evidence that the proponent and his wife, the attesting witnesses to the will, insinuated themselves into the decedent's life for the sinister purpose of procuring the proponent's nomination as the executor and trustee of the will. Furthermore, the proponent fully disclosed the financial consequences of this arrangement to the decedent (see, Matter of Atterbury, 173 A.D.2d 817; cf., Matter of Weinstock, 40 N.Y.2d 1). Mangano, P.J., Sullivan, Thompson and Friedmann, JJ., concur.

MATTER OF ESBERG