Ordered, that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the branch of the cross-motion which was to disqualify the law firm is denied.
The respondents seek to disqualify the law firm of Beigel Sandler, presently known as Beigel Schy Lasky Rifkind Goldberg Fertik Gelber (hereinafter the law firm), from serving as the plaintiffs' counsel on the ground that it also represents the respondents Ira Orshan and Joel Katz on unrelated matters. However, the respondents' allegations are insufficient to establish that an attorney-client relationship exists between Orshan and Katz and the law firm. Although the law firm has represented some limited partnerships in which Orshan and Katz are limited partners, this fact does not render Orshan and Katz clients of the law firm unless the law firm assumed an affirmative duty to represent them (see, Quintel Corp. v Citibank, 589 F. Supp. 1235, 1241-1242). The record is devoid of any evidence that the law firm affirmatively assumed the duty of representing either Orshan or Katz.
The respondents contend that the law firm represents a limited partnership of which a general partner is a corporation. Orshan and Katz are officers of that corporation. However, even if the law firm represented the corporation in question, it would not thereby represent the corporation's individual officers and directors (see, Stratton Group v Sprayregen, 466 F. Supp. 1180, 1184, n 3).
Since the respondents failed to establish the existence of an attorney-client relationship between the respondents Orshan and Katz and the law firm of Beigel Sandler, the Supreme Court erred by disqualifying the law firm to serve as counsel for the plaintiffs. Rosenblatt, J.P., Ritter, Pizzuto and Krausman, JJ., concur.