SMITH, J.
In this case we address issues of the preclusive effect of a social security disability award, evidentiary objections not raised at hearing, the specificity required in a decision, attorney's fees for pre-November 1, 1986 injuries, and the requirement that the judge decide all issues presented. We find no error except for the failure to address all issues presented in the case. We remand for further findings on the causal connection, reasonableness and necessity of employee's medical treatment. In all other respects we affirm the decision.
Facts
Sharon McCarthy was a twenty-nine year old married woman with three minor children. A high school graduate, she had worked as a retail clerk, security officer and warehouse worker. In the latter capacity, she received multiple personal injuries on February 13, 1986 arising out of and in the course of her employment for Charrette Corporation. Her average weekly wage at the time of the injury was $224.
National Union Fire paid Sharon McCarthy § 34 benefits for temporary total incapacity until those benefits were exhausted. McCarthy then filed claims for § 34A permanent and total incapacity benefits and § 36 permanent impairment benefits. The claims were denied at conference and McCarthy appealed for hearing.
In her issues statement filed at the commencement of the hearing, McCarthy listed her claims for §§ 34A and 36 benefits. The insurer's issues statement denied entitlement to §§ 13 and 30 medical benefits as well as those claims.
Before taking testimony, the judge reviewed the issues in dispute. (Tr. 1-7.) The employee again claimed §§ 34A and 36 benefits. The insurer questioned the extent of McCarthy's injury and asserted that any disability which she did have was unrelated to the industrial accident.
The judge adopted the medical opinion of the insurer's examining physician, Dr. Bryon Hartunian, who found the employee capable of performing a desk job. Dr. Hartunian's opinion was consistent with that of the impartial examiner, Dr. John Grady, whose examination was arranged by the judge. Grady "diagnosed her difficulties as cervical and dorso-lumbar strain, internal derangement of the right knee, post-surgical . . . sprain and ligament instability right ankle, post surgery, TMJ bilateral and dental injury" causally related to the industrial accident. (Dec. 5.) Based upon Grady's opinion, the judge found that McCarthy could not return to her pre-injury job but could do lighter work. Id. The judge rejected McCarthy's claim of total incapacity in part because of these medical opinions and in part because of the "credible and persuasive" evidence presented by a private investigator. (Dec. 6-7.)
The examination was performed under the provision of G.L.c. 152, § 11A as it existed prior to the 1991 reforms. Therefore there are no issues regarding prima facie weight. The employee objected to the report. We find after our review that the judge did not err in admitting it.
The judge concluded, based upon her physical condition and her age, education, and experience that McCarthy was capable of earning $120 per week. (Dec. 8-9.) He therefore denied her claim for § 34A permanent and total incapacity and awarded ongoing partial compensation at the rate of $69.33 per week. He ordered the insurer to pay the employee's attorney a fee of seven times the state average weekly wage. He also awarded $20,421.45 for § 36 permanent impairment benefits.
Although McCarthy testified that her medical bills after January 31, 1990 had not been paid, (Tr. 13) and offered the unpaid bills as exhibits (Employee's Ex. C, D and E.), the judge did not address the reasonableness and necessity of her medical treatment or its causal connection to the industrial injuries. The decision did not contain a specific order awarding or denying medical benefits. (Dec. 9-10.)
The insurer moved for reconsideration of the attorney's fees award. After hearing on the motion, the judge issued an amended decision awarding only reasonable costs of litigation. The employee appealed the amended decision.
Issues
On appeal, the employee raises eight issues. We summarily affirm the decision on all issues except for the following:
1. Is the employee entitled to counsel fees?
2. Is the employee entitled to §§ 13 and 30 medical benefits?
3. Does the decision of the Social Security Administration on the issue of disability preclude a determination that the employee's incapacity is less than permanent and total?
We address these three issues in turn.
1. ATTORNEYS FEES
The employee contends that her entitlement to legal fees is governed by G.L.c. 152, § 13A(3). We disagree. The applicable provision is § 13A(9) which governs all injuries occurring prior to November 1, 1986.
Any attorney's fee due employee's counsel is not payable by the insurer. The employee filed the pending claim which was denied at conference. She appealed for hearing. Where an employee appeals a conference order and prevails at hearing, pursuant to G.L.c. 152, § 13A(9), any fee "shall be of an amount agreed upon between the employee and the attorney." Gormley v. Mike's Truck Stop, 8 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 160, 161 (1994); Harnett v. MDC Water Resources Auth., 8 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 204 (1994); Joppas v. Rand-Whitney Container Corp., 6 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 73, 75 (1992).
2. MEDICAL BENEFITS
The employee asserts that the decision is inadequate because it fails to adjudicate entitlement to medical services. This issue was presented to the judge who failed to explicitly decide it. We agree that the decision fails to meet the requirements of G.L.c. 152, § 11B. The employee is entitled to a decision regarding payment of her outstanding medical bills. We remand for that determination.
3. PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY AWARD
The employee argues that the award of social security benefits establishes her right to permanent and total incapacity benefits. We disagree.
Normal res judicata rules prevent its application here. Application of the res judicata doctrine ordinarily requires the same parties, the same claims, and the same law as the prior adjudication. There is no identity between the parties to the social security proceeding and the parties to this workers' compensation action. And the issues in the two proceedings are different. 3 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation, §§ 79.71(b), 79.72(e) and (f) (1994 and Supp.). The two statutes have different standards of medical proof on the question of benefit entitlement; disability under the federal social security act does not prove incapacity under the Massachusetts workers' compensation act. Furthermore, under social security, all medical conditions are considered in determining benefit entitlement; under workers' compensation only only work-related conditions may be considered. G.L.c. 152, § 26.
42 USCS § 423(d) defines disability for social security disability entitlement purposes in part as "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. . . . In determining whether an individual's physical or mental impairment or impairments are of a sufficient medical severity that such impairment or impairments could be the basis of eligibility under this section, the Commissioner of Social Security shall consider the combined effect of all the individual's impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of such severity . . ." (emphasis supplied).
We see no reason to treat social security awards differently than awards of unemployment benefits. ". . . [P]roper results will be reached if each of the respective agencies required to administer these two forms of financial assistance acts independently within its own sphere upon the evidence before it, simply according necessary recognition to the action of the other." Gallant's Case, 329 Mass. 607, 609, 109 N.E.2d 829, 830 (1953). Social security awards may serve as evidence in our forum. The administrative judge may determine what significance, if any, attaches to the social security decision.
Other workers' compensation agencies confronted with the question have reached the same conclusion. See Velilla v. UTC/Hamilton Standard Div., 1990 WL 159620 (Conn. Work. Comp. Com.); McLean v. Plastics, Inc., 1988 WL 216987 (Minn. Work. Comp. Ct. App.); Appeal No. 931045, 1993 WL 553909 (Tex. Work. Comp. Com.); Garcia v. Sealift Command, 35 E.C.A.B. 995, 1984 WL 34660 (FECA claim); Anderson v. U.S. Postal Service, 37 E.C.A.B. 277, 1986 WL 53296 (FECA claim). Compare Monaci v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 116 Pa. Commw. 172, 541 A.2d 60, 61-62 (1988) (social security decision excluded from evidence as not relevant).
We hold that an award of social security disability benefits has no conclusive effect in a proceeding under the Massachusetts workers' compensation act. The judge was not compelled to find permanent and total incapacity because the employee had been awarded social security disability benefits.
Conclusion
The case is remanded to the administrative judge for a determination of the medical benefits to which the employee was entitled. In all other respects, the decision is affirmed. So ordered.
Judges Kirby and Maze-Rothstein concur.