REA, District Judge.
On April 17, 1995, the Court conducted a hearing on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Neither party, however, submitted an appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law for the Court to sign. Thus, the Court explicates herein the bases for the Court's decision to grant defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
1. Plaintiffs believe that the defendant inappropriately partitioned Joint Council 42, on October 1, 1994, by removing local unions from Joint Council 42 and granting those local unions a new Joint Council charter within the geographic area of the old Joint Council 42.
2. Plaintiffs contend that defendant violated the LMRDA §§ 101(a)(2), 101(a)(4), and 609, [ 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2)] because the decision to partition Joint Council 42 and to authorize a new, separate Joint Council was made with a retaliatory motive against plaintiffs in attempt to discourage plaintiffs from exercising their free speech rights. Plaintiffs contend that such action constitutes a form of prohibited "discipline."
3. Only the individual plaintiffs have standing to sue under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2), Section 1 of the LMRDA. See Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 102 S.Ct. 1867, 72 L.Ed.2d 239 (1982) (the Act protects "rank-and-file union members — not union officers or employees . . ." and the Act only protects the member from acts that "affect a union member's rights or status as a member of the union.")
4. The individual plaintiffs here have not demonstrated that their status as union members have been affected. At most, the partitioning of the Joint Council indirectly affects their status as union members by making the particular Joint Council smaller. But, such indirect interference is not actionable under § 411.
5. Moreover, there is ample evidence that the decision to partition the Joint Council was made for legitimate reasons. Thus, any indirect "chilling effect" on the free speech rights of the Joint Council or its members is outweighed by the concerns leading to the decision to partition the Joint Councils and the correct procedure for partitioning a Joint Council was followed.
6. Plaintiffs also allege that the defendant's decision to partition Joint Council 42 is a form of sanctions by the union that violates Section 609 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 529.
7. As discussed above, however, the United States Supreme Court explained that only acts that affect the union member's status as a union member are actionable under the LMRDA, Section 609.
8. Plaintiffs' analogy of the instant case to cases involving mergers, consolidations, or revocations of charters is inapposite here. Caselaw dictates that mergers violate the LMRDA if the decision to merge is motivated by the desire to retaliate against a charter or charter member for exercising free speech or litigation rights. Nonetheless, partitioning a Joint Council does not constitute "discipline" under Section 609. See, e.g., Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers, 493 U.S. 67, 110 S.Ct. 424, 107 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989). Those who disagreed with plaintiffs and sought a new, independent Joint Council, did so to disassociate themselves from plaintiffs, which they have a right to do. Defendant's action does not force upon plaintiffs any rule, law, or other similar action that plaintiffs otherwise have voted against. Furthermore, denying defendant's right to disassociate itself from plaintiffs would cause greater harm than allowing the partition. Forcing them to remain associated with plaintiffs is more akin to forcing a merger of two Joint Councils or of local unions.
9. Plaintiffs also allege a breach of the Union Constitution in violation of § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Plaintiffs' argument is based on the principle that a Union Constitution may be treated as a contract between the parties. Local 1052 v. Los Angeles County Council of Carpenters, 944 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1991).
10. The only provision, however, of the Union Constitution that may have been breached is Article XV, § 1(a), which states, "Whenever three (3) or more Local Unions are located in one (1) city they shall form a Joint Council, but where there are only a few Local Unions in small cities or towns, they shall affiliate with the Joint Council in the large cities."
11. The Court does not find that Article XV, § 1(a), limits the number of Joint Councils that may exist in a city and the IBT has not interpreted the constitution to possess such a limitation.
12. The IBT Constitution, Article IX, Section 1 provides that the "General Executive Board shall have the authority to interpret and apply the Constitution and laws of the International Union and to decide all questions of law thereunder subject to appeal to the next Convention. The General Executive Board shall have governing authority over the International Union and its subordinate bodies to the end of upholding the laws and policies of the Brotherhood as expressed in the Constitution."
13. The IBT Constitution, Article VII, Section 3 provides that the "General Executive Board shall have the authority to change the jurisdiction granted or set forth in the charter at any time in its sole discretion." Thus, the IBT's ratification of the partition decision implies that such action is not forbidden by the Union Constitution.
14. As a matter of law, a union's interpretation of its own constitution is entitled to substantial deference. Local 1052 v. Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters, 944 F.2d 610, 614 (9th Cir. 1991). The union's interpretation should be upheld unless it is "patently unreasonable." Local 48 v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters Joiners, 920 F.2d 1047 (1st Cir. 1990).
15. The Court does not find that the IBT's decision is patently unreasonable.
16. Based on the foregoing, summary judgment in defendant's favor is appropriate here.
IT IS SO ORDERED.