Ordered that the judgment and the amended judgment are affirmed.
Viewing the evidence adduced at the trial of Indictment No. 272/91 in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
The defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in permitting the complainant, who was seven years old at the time of the abuse and eleven years old at the time of the trial, to give sworn testimony. We disagree. The court's examination of the complainant demonstrated that she understood the nature of testifying under oath and was competent to be sworn as a witness (see, CPL 60.20; People v. Nisoff, 36 N.Y.2d 560).
The defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his contention that the expert should not have been permitted to testify about the symptoms of child sexual abuse syndrome. In any event, there is no merit to the defendant's contention that the expert testimony concerning child sexual abuse syndrome was inadmissible. This testimony helped to explain the complainant's behavior after the abuse, and was not within the purview of the average juror (see, People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277; People v Burgess, 212 A.D.2d 721).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Bracken, J.P., Balletta, Copertino and Hart, JJ., concur.