In this negligence action, the court improperly granted leave to amend the notices of claim. The slippery seat theory, essentially a claim of design defect, was not alluded to in the complaint or in the original notices of claim which asserted only human error and a defect in the steering mechanism. It was first sought to be interposed long after the one year and 90-day limitation had passed (Public Authorities Law § 1212; General Municipal Law § 50-e; Pierson v. City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 950; Nowinsky v. City of New York, 189 A.D.2d 674, 675). Moreover, this was not the type of omission that may be corrected at any time pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (6) (cf., e.g., Ortiz v. New York City Hous. Auth., 214 A.D.2d 491; Seise v City of New York, 212 A.D.2d 467).
Since the notices of claim may not be amended, then any proposed amendment to the bill of particulars incorporating the same barred claims would be without merit and the proposed amendment of the bill of particulars must be denied on that ground (see, e.g., Daniels v. Empire-Orr, Inc., 151 A.D.2d 370, 371 [1st Dept 1989]).
Concur — Murphy, P.J., Rubin, Kupferman and Mazzarelli, JJ.