Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with one bill of costs payable by the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs, the motion for summary judgment is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is well settled that in order to obtain summary judgment the movant must make a "prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact" (Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324). The burden then shifts to the opponent to come forward with some proof in admissible form that there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude the granting of summary judgment (see, Israelson v. Rubin, 20 A.D.2d 668, affd 14 N.Y.2d 887).
At bar, the plaintiff's submission in support of summary judgment was sufficient to meet his initial burden to sustain a prima facie case (see, Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 N.Y.2d 513; Tate v. Clancy-Cullen Stor. Co., 171 A.D.2d 292; Merante v. IBM, 169 A.D.2d 710). Thereafter, in opposition, the appellants submitted an affidavit by a witness creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the third-party defendant Essential Electric Corporation complied with the provisions of Labor Law § 240 (1) by providing safety devices so placed as to give proper protection to the plaintiff on the day of the accident (see, Labor Law § 240; Bland v. Manocherian, 66 N.Y.2d 452; Haimes v. New York Tel. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 132; Figueroa v Manhattanville Coll., 193 A.D.2d 778; Merante v. IBM, supra).
Accordingly, we find that the Supreme Court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of liability in favor of the plaintiff. Balletta, J.P., O'Brien, Thompson and Hart, JJ., concur.