FISCHEL, J.
On June 21, 1993, this Board recommitted this case in order for the administrative judge to make factual findings concerning the causal relationship between the industrial injury to the employee's right hand and a subsequent injury which she suffered during her hospitalization. See Gulcynzski v. Granada Hospital Group, 7 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 151, 153 (1993). Specifically, we ordered that the administrative judge should determine whether the employee's act of shaving her legs, an act which resulted in an infected cut, "was necessary or reasonable activity," or whether her actions amounted to an intervening act which broke the chain of causation in light of the employee's use of her non-dominant hand and her known propensity for infection. Id. The administrative judge found, in a decision filed on February 28, 1994, that the employee's conduct in shaving her legs was necessary and reasonable under the circumstances that:
The employee was hospitalized for over two weeks, and her right major hand was in a cast, as a result of skin grafts for her work related injury. She was given permission by her doctor to bathe, and using a razor provided by the hospital she shaved her legs using her left minor hand, sustaining a cut on her leg which later became infected.
the Claimant was in the habit of shaving her legs on a regular basis as a part of her hygiene regimen; she shaved her legs with the permission of the Hospital staff who were aware of the circumstances of her hospitalization including her propensity for infection; [and] she informed the staff of her injury immediately after it was incurred.
(Dec. 2) The judge found no evidence that the employee ever sustained a similar infection from the act of shaving her legs. (Dec. 5) Based on these factual findings, the administrative judge concluded that the act of shaving her legs with her non-dominant hand did not break the causal connection, and that the employee's leg injury was a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment. (Dec. 7)
The judge's decision is well reasoned as to the issue of liability and causal relationship outlined above, and we find nothing in the decision that is beyond the scope of her authority, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to law. G.L.c. 152, § 11C. This being so, we summarily affirm the decision respecting that issue.
In our prior decision in this matter, we noted the insufficiency of the ruling that ordered the insurer to pay § 34 benefits until the date of the decision, due to a lack of specific findings of disability. Gulczynski, supra at 152. The insurer again raises this issue on appeal, arguing that the date of decision is not an appropriate date for the termination of benefits and that the evidence supports an earlier termination. (Insurer Brief 20-21.) It is well settled that the termination of benefits as of the filing date of the decision is arbitrary, since the administrative judge's finding of incapacity and extent thereof must be grounded in the evidence contained in the record. Sullivan v. Commercial Trailer Repair, 7 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 8, 9 (1993); but see Cubellis v. Mozzarella House, Inc., 9 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. ____ 354 (1995).
Since neither the original June 11, 1990 decision, nor the decision upon recommittal, contain adequate "findings regarding the employee's incapacity to work as a result of her hand and/or leg injuries," Gulczynski, supra at 154, we must recommit this case for subsidiary findings as to extent of incapacity. In view of the passage of time, the judge may allow such further evidence as may aid her in making this determination. So ordered.
Judges McCarthy and Wilson concur.