DECKER v. DECKER

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Docket Number

No. 94-2235.

Attorney(S)

Tracy B. Newmark, Terry Ellen Fixel, and August La Rocco of Fixel La Rocco, Hollywood, for appellant. William L. Gardiner, III, of Gardiner and Gardiner, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Judges

SORONDO, RODOLFO, Jr., Associate Judge.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage between Herbert M. Decker (appellant) and Joan Susan Decker (appellee). The trial court awarded Joan permanent alimony and child support and distributed the marital assets. At the time of the final hearing, the parties had been married for 27 years and had two daughters aged 17 and 18. Herbert was employed earning a gross annual income of $75,000 plus travel reimbursements, while Joan, age 49, worked as a sales associate earning approximately $6.30 per hour. The court ordered Herbert to pay for the children's health insurance, Joan's outstanding medical expenses, permanent alimony of $2,695 per month, child support of $924 per month, and attorney's fees. The distribution of assets left Herbert with mostly IRA accounts valued at about $138,398 (with $33,500 accessible) and Joan with assets valued at $144,000 (including $40,000 equity in the marital home and liquid assets).

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the cumulative effect of the permanent alimony, child support, and asset distribution awards constituted an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Whether the trial court erred by ordering the appellant to pay appellee's outstanding medical expenses without setting a cap on his potential financial liability.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The cumulative financial awards (alimony, child support, and asset division) were excessive and constituted an abuse of discretion, leaving him with an unfairly low net income.
The trial court erred in ordering him to pay for appellee's outstanding medical expenses without limiting his financial liability.

Appellee's Arguments

Appellee contended that the appellant’s child support obligation would decrease after the minor child reached majority, thereby reducing his financial burden.
Appellee conceded the appellant’s second issue on appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)	Trial courts must ensure that neither spouse moves from misfortune to prosperity or vice versa; awards must be fair under the totality of circumstances.	Used as the foundational standard to evaluate the fairness of the financial awards in this dissolution case.
Gentile v. Gentile, 565 So.2d 820 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)	Cumulative alimony and child support awards that consume an excessive portion of the obligor’s income can constitute an abuse of discretion.	Referenced to illustrate that awards consuming 79% of net income are unfair, analogous to the present case.
Blum v. Blum, 382 So.2d 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)	Excessive awards that leave the obligor destitute are improper.	Quoted to reinforce that the appellant would be left destitute under the current award.
McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So.2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 357 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1978)	An award should allow the recipient to maintain some semblance of former lifestyle without unduly impairing the obligor's incentive to work.	Used to emphasize the balance the court must strike between the parties' financial well-being.
Thomas v. Thomas, 418 So.2d 316 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)	Alimony and child support awards exceeding a significant portion (58%) of net income can be reversed as abuse of discretion.	Applied as precedent to support reversal of the award in the present case.
Sokol v. Sokol, 441 So.2d 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)	Award totaling 71% of husband's take-home pay was an abuse of discretion.	Referenced to support the court’s conclusion that the award was excessive.
Nicholson v. Nicholson, 372 So.2d 178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)	Award amounting to 86% of take-home pay was improper.	Used to demonstrate precedent for disallowing overly burdensome financial awards.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the financial circumstances of the parties, noting Herbert’s net monthly income was approximately $4,800, while the combined alimony and child support payments totaled $3,619, leaving him only $1,181 per month for living expenses. This equated to about 76% of his net income going to support obligations, leaving a net annual income of $14,172. In contrast, Joan’s combined income from alimony, child support, and employment was approximately $54,256 gross, or about $40,692 net. The court found this disparity "glaring and unfair," relying on established precedent that cumulative awards should not leave the obligor destitute or impair his incentive to work. The court rejected the appellee's argument that future reductions in child support would remedy the imbalance, emphasizing the present unfairness. Additionally, the court found error in the trial court’s failure to cap the appellant’s liability for the appellee’s outstanding medical expenses. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for a thorough reevaluation consistent with the cited case law.

Holding and Implications

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding cumulative alimony and child support payments that consumed an excessive portion of the appellant’s net income, resulting in an unfair disparity between the parties. The order to pay outstanding medical expenses without a financial liability cap was also erroneous. The case was remanded for reconsideration of the financial awards and setting a defined limit on medical expenses. This decision directly affects the parties by requiring a recalibration of financial obligations but does not establish new legal precedent beyond applying existing principles.

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HERBERT M. DECKER, APPELLANT, v. JOAN SUSAN DECKER, APPELLEE.

SORONDO, RODOLFO, Jr., Associate Judge.

This is an appeal from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage awarding the appellee, Joan, permanent alimony and child support, and distributing marital assets. The appellant, Herbert, argues that the cumulative effect of the awards was an abuse of discretion. We agree and reverse.

At the time of the final hearing Herbert and Joan had been married for twenty-seven (27) years. At the time they had two (2) daughters, Kelly, age 18, and Courtney who would turn 17 in August of 1994.

Herbert was employed at a Texas firm called Rawson Company and was earning $65,000 per year, plus a guaranteed $10,000 bonus, for a total of $75,000. Additionally, Herbert received reimbursement for travel expenses incurred during his frequent business trips.

Joan, age 49, was employed as a sales associate. She had only a high school degree and earned $6.30 per hour for a thirty hour work week plus a 5% commission.

The cost of health insurance for the family was $268.00 per month. The policy of insurance also contained a deductible and co-payment provision. Herbert was paying for this at the time of the final hearing.

Joan was scheduled for surgery in April of 1994 and was advised that she needed $600.00 prior to her entry into the hospital for her physician. The doctor's total bill was $3,000. She was advised by her insurance company that they would pay 80% of her medical costs.

Final judgment was entered on July 7, 1994. It ordered Herbert to continue to pay for health insurance of the parties' children at a cost of $268.00 per month. He was additionally ordered to pay Joan's outstanding medical expenses and to be equally responsible for any deductibles and non-covered medical expenses of the parties' minor daughter.

The trial court further ordered Herbert to pay permanent periodic alimony in the sum of $2,695 per month and child support for the minor daughter in the amount of $924.00 per month.

Finally the court awarded Joan attorney's fees and divided the parties' assets. Under the distribution scheme fashioned by the trial court Herbert kept assets, mostly IRA accounts, valued at $138,398. Of this amount, approximately $33,500 is presently accessible to him. Joan was awarded assets valued at $144,000. A portion of this, approximately $40,000, represents 50% of the equity in the marital home; the balance is liquid and presently accessible to her.

In Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1204 (Fla. 1980), the Florida Supreme Court stated:

We recognize that a trial court need not equalize the financial positions of the parties. However, a trial judge must ensure that neither spouse passes automatically from misfortune to prosperity or from prosperity to misfortune, and, in viewing the totality of the circumstances, one spouse should not be "shortchanged."

In the present case Herbert takes home a net income of approximately $4,800 per month. The alimony and child support ordered equals $3,619 per month and constitutes 76% of his total net monthly income. Herbert is thus left with a net monthly income of approximately $1,181. Accordingly, out of a gross income of $75,000 per year, Herbert is left with a net income of $14,172.

Joan, on the other hand, collects $43,428 from Herbert and $10,828 from her job (not counting commissions) for a total gross yearly income of $54,256. Allowing a reduction from that amount for taxes, Joan's net income would be approximately $40,692.

The disparity between the parties' net incomes is glaring and unfair. In Gentile v. Gentile, 565 So.2d 820 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), this court stated:

Although each award of alimony and child support, standing alone, may not be objectionable, it is the cumulative effect of these awards which makes the trial court's judgment an abuse of discretion. As was noted in the similar case of Blum v. Blum, 382 So.2d 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), compliance with the final judgment will leave the appellant destitute and unable to provide even the most basic living expenses. This court has stated that an award to a wife should permit her to retain some semblance of her former life style "while at the same time ensuring that the husband is not strapped so that his incentive to strive forward and his lust for life are seriously impaired."

Id. at 822 (quoting McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So.2d 352, 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 357 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1978)). In Gentile we disapproved an alimony and child support award which amounted to 79% of the husband's total net income and stated:

While some may dispute the financial level at which a spouse loses his "lust for life" and incentive to strive forward, we do not think that anyone would seriously disagree that being left with less than $10,000 to live on out of a $73,000 salary would certainly stifle any incentive the husband here might have for getting up every morning and going to work.

Id. at 822. The numbers in the present case are remarkably similar to those in Gentile and equally unfair.

Under circumstances less onerous than those in Gentile, in Thomas v. Thomas, 418 So.2d 316 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), we reversed an alimony and child support award which amounted to 58% of the husband's net income. Likewise in Sokol v. Sokol, 441 So.2d 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), the Second District Court of Appeal disallowed an award totalling 71% of the husband's take home pay as an abuse of discretion and in Nicholson v. Nicholson, 372 So.2d 178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), the same court similarly disallowed an award which amounted to 86% of take home pay.

The appellee argues that because the minor child of the parties will reach the age of majority in August of 1995 the appellant's monthly child support responsibility will be reduced by $924.00 per month, thus making the financial obligations of the appellant less rigorous. Although it is true that the husband's financial obligation will be reduced after August of 1995, he will still have to pay his ex-wife 56% of his total net monthly income and appellee will still receive a net yearly income more than $7,000 greater than appellant's.

We do not reach the appellee's suggestion that the post-August numbers, as they presently exist, will satisfy the Canakaris test for reasonableness. Instead we remand to the trial court for a thorough re-evaluation of the parties' present financial circumstances and an award that is consistent with the principles enunciated in the case law discussed above and this opinion.

Appellee has conceded the appellant's second issue on appeal.

Appellant argues in his third and final issue that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay for appellee's present outstanding medical expenses not covered by insurance without setting a cap on his potential financial liability. We reverse on this issue as well and remand with directions that the trial court establish the exact amount of the appellant's financial liability.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

GLICKSTEIN and STONE, JJ., concur.