The IAS Court, in granting the motion by Merrill Lynch seeking to vacate the notice of pendency on the subject property, properly determined that the complaint filed with the notice did not adequately plead a cause of action for the imposition of a constructive trust upon the subject property, including the element of a promise, express or implied, to transfer title to the subject property to the plaintiff ( see, McGrath v. Hilding, 41 N.Y.2d 625, 628-629), so as to warrant the filing of the notice of pendency ( see, 5303 Realty Corp. v. O Y Equity Corp., 64 N.Y.2d 313, 323; Borrero v. East Harlem Council for Human Servs., 165 A.D.2d 807). A claim that real property is a marital asset subject to distribution does not, by itself, establish grounds for a lis pendens ( Gross v. Gross, 114 A.D.2d 1002).
Plaintiff pro se has also failed to establish that Merrill Lynch had actual knowledge prior to making a mortgage loan to the defendant of any alleged "on-going fraud" being perpetrated by the defendant in the transfer of the subject property or that Merrill Lynch had acted in bad faith with respect to either the title to the subject property or the notice of pendency.
We have reviewed plaintiff's remaining claims and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Murphy, P.J., Wallach, Ross, Nardelli and Tom, JJ.