Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him of rape in the second degree (Penal Law § 130.30), defendant contends that reversal is required because the jury "selectively dissected" the testimony of the 13-year-old victim. That contention lacks merit. The credibility of the victim was a question for the jury and the jury was entitled to credit certain portions of the victim's testimony that it deemed worthy of belief and reject the rest (see, People v Rose, 215 A.D.2d 875; see also, People v Reed, 40 N.Y.2d 204, 208).
Defendant further contends that reversal is required because of the "hopeless contradictions" in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. He argues that their testimony must be rejected as incredible as a matter of law. That contention lacks merit. It cannot be said that the testimony is "`"incredible and unbelievable, that is, impossible of belief because it is manifestly untrue, physically impossible, contrary to experience, or self-contradictory"'" (People v Stroman, 83 A.D.2d 370, 373, quoting People v Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88; see, People v Briggs, 190 A.D.2d 995, 996, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 1011). "Minor inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses do not render that testimony incredible as a matter of law" (People v Robinson, 209 A.D.2d 1041, lv denied 84 N.Y.2d 1037). Here, minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses presented questions of credibility for resolution by the jury (see, People v Barr, 216 A.D.2d 890).
Lastly, we conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the sentence is neither unduly harsh nor severe.