Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, the cross motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as cross-appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that the appellants are awarded one bill of costs.
The plaintiff contends that "[i]n 1977 and 1978, [the corporate defendant's predecessor] Country Lake Homes, Inc., the then-owner of 53 `bungalow' units * * * on a single tax lot * * * developed a scheme of marketing these bungalow units for long term occupancy". The plaintiff alleges that this "scheme" called for the execution of what were characterized as leases. These leases allegedly provided for four successive 20-year terms, and also provided for payment of all of the consideration due to the landlord (other than a nominal fee of $10 per year) within the first three to five years of the first of the four 20-year terms. The tenants were required to become members of a homeowners' association which would administer "the common elements which support the community", and the tenants were responsible for the payment of real estate taxes, and the costs connected with water usage, sewer disposal, road maintenance, and other common elements.
In its complaint, the plaintiff sought, inter alia, a judgment declaring that the leases referred to above were in substance, albeit not in form, "assignable installment sales contract[s]". In support of their various affirmative defenses, the appellants alleged that the plaintiff had had notice of all the essential facts needed to properly plead its claims since 1976 or 1977, the plaintiff was guilty of laches, the plaintiff's claims were time-barred, and the plaintiff's claims were barred pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. With respect to the latter affirmative defense, the appellants alleged that a prior order of the Supreme Court, rendered in a different case ( see, Levy v. Country Lake Homes, 133 A.D.2d 70) should be given preclusive effect.
The complaint in the Levy action ( supra) purported to state causes of action on behalf of a class consisting of "106 persons who are tenants under written leases * * * [and who] occupy 46 buildings [on defendant's property]". In the Levy action, the plaintiff class sought a declaratory judgment interpreting "the rights of the class members to the relief sought under and pursuant to leases given to each of them by the defendants".
The appellants have demonstrated their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law based on their Statute of Limitations and res judicata defenses ( see, CPLR 3211 [a] [5]). The plaintiff's claim was not interposed within 6 years of its accrual, and is time-barred irrespective of whether it is considered one for declaratory judgment ( see, CPLR 213; Janiak v. Town of Greenville, 203 A.D.2d 329; 145 Kisco Ave. Corp. v. Dufner Enters., 198 A.D.2d 482; Amerada Hess Corp. v. Acampora, 109 A.D.2d 719) or one for reformation of the leases ( see, CPLR 213, [2]; Matter of Wallace v. 600 Partners Co., 205 A.D.2d 202; Lopata v. Lopata, 196 A.D.2d 741; Arrathoon v. East N.Y. Sav. Bank, 169 A.D.2d 804). We also find that the central issue raised in the present case could have been litigated in the Levy action, and that the present action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata ( see, O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353; Smith v. Russell Sage Coll., 54 N.Y.2d 185; Joem Intl. v Swedwall, Inc., 215 A.D.2d 530; Land v. Wesley, 214 A.D.2d 540). Bracken, J.P., Balletta, Pizzuto and Hart, JJ., concur.
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