1. Workers' Compensation § 69 (NCI4th) — civil action against co-employee not maintainable The decision of the Court of Appeals that plaintiff may not maintain this action for damages against her co-employee pursuant to Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, is affirmed.
Am Jur 2d, Workers' Compensation § 99.
2. Workers' Compensation § 62 (NCI4th) — Woodson claim not maintainable — substantial certainty test — language disavowed
Woodson v. Rowland329 N.C. 330Echols v. Zarn, Inc116 N.C. App. 364Woodson's
Am Jur 2d, Workers' Compensation § 75.
Justice ORR did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
PER CURIAM.
[1] With respect to plaintiff's first assignment of error as to whether she may maintain this action for damages against her co-employee, Edith Barnett, pursuant to the holding in Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985), we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
[2] With respect to plaintiff's second assignment of error as to whether she may maintain this action against her employer, Zarn, Inc., pursuant to the holding in Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991), we also affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. However, as we did in Mickles v. Duke Power Company, 342 N.C. 103, 463 S.E.2d 206 (1995), we disavow the language of the Court of Appeals in Echols v. Zarn, Inc., 116 N.C. App. 364, 378, 448 S.E.2d 289, 297 (1994), suggesting that the Restatement (Second) of Torts illustrates misconduct which satisfies Woodson's "substantial certainty" test. Restatement (Second) of Torts provides as follows:
A throws a bomb into B's office for the purpose of killing B. A knows that C, B's stenographer, is in the office. A has no desire to injure C, but knows that his act is substantially certain to do so. C is injured by the explosion. A is subject to liability to C for an intentional tort.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A illus. 1 (1965).
As we stated in Mickles,
[a]ccording to well-known principles of tort liability, one who intentionally engages in conduct knowing that particular results are substantially certain to follow also intends those results for purposes of tort liability. In the above example, A is
actually certain his act will injure or kill C. A successful claim under the
Woodson exception does not require such actual certainty.
Mickles, 342 N.C. at 110, 463 S.E.2d at 211.
Justice ORR did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
AFFIRMED.