Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that reversible error took place when the prosecutor asked him during cross-examination why he did not tell a police officer that the victim had attacked him. As only a general objection was raised to this question at trial, the issue is not preserved for appellate review (see, People v Bynum, 70 N.Y.2d 858). In any event, the defendant's contention is without merit. Generally, a defendant's postarrest silence cannot be used for impeachment purposes (see, People v Conyers, 52 N.Y.2d 454, 459). However, if a defendant speaks to the police and omits exculpatory information which he presents for the first time at trial, the defendant may be impeached with the omission (see, People v Savage, 50 N.Y.2d 673, 679, cert denied 449 U.S. 1016; People v Spinelli, 214 A.D.2d 135; People v West, 212 A.D.2d 651; People v Harrison, 149 A.D.2d 434). Furthermore, although the defendant's statement was not admissible as evidence-in-chief because it was obtained in violation of the defendant's Miranda rights, it was properly used for impeachment purposes (see, People v Maerling, 64 N.Y.2d 134; People v Wise, 46 N.Y.2d 321; People v Harris, 25 N.Y.2d 175, affd 401 U.S. 222).
The defendant's remaining contention that the conviction should be reversed because of certain of the prosecutor's summation remarks is similarly unpreserved for appellate review (see, People v Comer, 73 N.Y.2d 955; People v Medina, 53 N.Y.2d 951) and is, in any event, without merit (see, People v Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396; People v Brown, 180 A.D.2d 549). Mangano, P.J., Bracken, Sullivan and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.