Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The court did not err by denying the defendant's challenge for cause of a prospective juror. The record does not support a finding that the prospective juror possessed a "state of mind that [was] likely to preclude [her] from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at trial" (CPL 270.20 [b]), or that there was a "substantial risk" that she would be unable to discharge her responsibilities as a juror (see, People v Campbell, 216 A.D.2d 482; People v Pagan, 191 A.D.2d 651; People v Whitmore, 177 A.D.2d 525).
Nor was it error for the court to admit into evidence a marked copy of an enlargement of the defendant's fingerprints. Although this enlargement should have been disclosed to the defendant prior to trial, the court's "refusal to impose `the extreme sanction of preclusion [which] is warranted only where undue prejudice will result from the failure to [timely] produce' (People v Kehn, 109 A.D.2d 912, 914, citing People v Brown, 104 Misc.2d 157, 163-165; see, CPL 240.70), was within the court's sound discretion (see, People v Kelly, 62 N.Y.2d 516, 521)" (People v Johnstone, 131 A.D.2d 782).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Thompson, J.P., Joy, Goldstein and Florio, JJ., concur.