Defendant's claim that the trial court's directions to restrict defense counsel's opening statement to "what you intend to prove by way of evidence in the case" impermissibly shifted the burden of proof is unpreserved for appellate review (CPL 470.05), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. Were we to review it, we would find that the court's instructions were substantively correct and did not imply that the defendant had a burden to prove anything ( see, People v Martinez, 207 A.D.2d 284, lv denied 84 N.Y.2d 908; cf., People v Rodriguez, 211 A.D.2d 443).
It was a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion to restrict cross-examination of the victim as to the fact of his prior motor vehicle accidents, and to preclude the details thereof, as such details bore little relevance to the intentional assault charge or the intoxication defense ( see, People v Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 201-202; People v Trinidad, 177 A.D.2d 286, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 865).
The trial court's interested witness charge was appropriate as defendant was the only interested witness as a matter of law in the case. The court also informed the jury that they could consider the interest of all witnesses in determining credibility ( see, People v Huynh, 215 A.D.2d 168; People v Bowden, 198 A.D.2d 39).
Concur — Murphy, P.J., Sullivan, Rosenberger, Ross and Tom, JJ.