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Docket Number

S95A1151.

Attorney(S)

Mark T. Sallee, for appellant. Lydia J. Sartain, District Attorney, Leonard C. Parks Jr., Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Richard J. Warren, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Judges

SEARS, Justice.

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Smart Summary

Tedder v. The State, S95A1151 (Supreme Court of Georgia, Nov. 20, 1995) — Opinion Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion arises from appellant Troy Stephen Tedder's trial and convictions for felony murder, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and robbery in Hall Superior Court (Judge Story presiding).

The facts proven at trial establish that Tedder, while passing through Gainesville, Georgia on his way to North Carolina, met the male victim in a motel bar and accompanied him to a motel room. Shortly thereafter Tedder appeared at the motel front desk shirtless and shoeless with blood smeared on his chest and told the clerk that he and a friend had fought and that he had the key to the room but could not remember which room it fit. Tedder then fled the motel. Motel employees found the victim beaten to death in the motel room, which had been ransacked. An autopsy concluded the victim died of multiple blunt impacts to his head.

After fleeing to North Carolina, Tedder confessed to a friend that he had murdered the victim after the victim made sexual advances toward him and that he had stolen the victim's money. At trial Tedder asserted self-defense, claiming the killing occurred after the victim attempted to sodomize him.

Procedural history as stated in the opinion: the murder occurred September 17–18, 1993; indictment was returned March 17, 1994; trial ran November 9–15, 1994, resulting in guilty verdicts. The aggravated assault and battery convictions were merged into the felony murder conviction. The court sentenced Tedder to life imprisonment and an additional 20 years on the robbery conviction to run concurrently. Sentencing entry filed November 16, 1994. Tedder filed a motion for new trial on December 15, 1994 (transcript certified December 23, 1994); the motion was denied February 20, 1995. Tedder filed a timely notice of appeal March 9, 1995; the appeal was docketed April 14, 1995 and submitted for decision without oral argument on June 5, 1995.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the evidence was sufficient, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, for a rational trier of fact to find Tedder guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and robbery.
Whether the trial court erred in denying Tedder's challenges to the State's exercise of six peremptory strikes against male members of the jury pool — specifically, whether those strikes were gender-based in violation of the Equal Protection principles articulated in Batson and extended to gender in J.E.B. v. Alabama.
Other trial-related claims summarized by the Court (including the claim that the trial court erred in recharging the jury on felony murder without repeating an earlier Edge instruction and Tedder's request that Edge be extended to this case).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Tedder argued that the State exercised six peremptory strikes against male jurors solely on the basis of gender, relying on the stereotype that heterosexual men are homophobic and therefore would be unsympathetic to a homosexual victim — a practice he contended violated equal protection.
At trial, Tedder's substantive defense was self-defense: he claimed he killed the victim after the victim attempted to sodomize him.
Tedder also raised other enumerations on appeal, including that the trial court erred in recharging the jury on felony murder without repeating an earlier Edge instruction and sought application/extension of Edge to his case.

State's Arguments

The State contended that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was sufficient for a rational juror to find Tedder guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (the opinion cites Jackson v. Virginia for the sufficiency standard).
With respect to the peremptory strikes challenge, the State provided gender-neutral, reasonably specific, and case-related explanations for each strike: during voir dire several of the struck male jurors had expressed hostile attitudes toward gay men (which could make them unsympathetic to the victim) and others had expressed animus toward the district attorney's office.
The State implicitly argued that its legitimate interest in securing a fair and impartial jury allowed it to use peremptory challenges for reasons related to bias expressed by prospective jurors, so long as gender alone did not serve as a proxy for bias.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)	Standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence: whether, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.	The Court applied Jackson to conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Tedder guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the charged counts.
J.E.B. v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994)	Extension of Batson to gender: Equal Protection prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender; once a prima facie showing of gender-based discrimination is made, the party exercising the strike must provide a gender-neutral, reasonably specific, case-related explanation.	The Court relied on J.E.B.'s framework: assuming without deciding that a prima facie showing was made, the Court found the State offered gender-neutral and reasonably specific explanations related to the case, and therefore the peremptory strikes were permissible.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)	Prohibits race-based peremptory strikes; establishes burden-shifting framework for challenging peremptory strikes (prima facie showing then neutral explanation).	J.E.B. extends Batson's principles to gender; the Court treated Batson/J.E.B. as the governing standard for evaluating Tedder's challenge to gender-based peremptory strikes.
Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865, 414 S.E.2d 463 (1992)	Discussed in connection with jury instructions on felony murder and the necessity/role of an "Edge" instruction (as referenced by the parties' claims).	The appellant urged that the trial court erred by recharging the jury on felony murder without repeating an earlier Edge instruction and asked that Edge be extended to his case; the Court reviewed these contentions among other enumerations and found them to be without merit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in discrete steps tied to the enumerated issues:

Sufficiency of the Evidence: The Court reviewed the trial evidence "in a light most favorable to the verdict" and applied the Jackson v. Virginia standard. Given the testimony and physical evidence (Tedder's bloodied appearance, his flight, the ransacked room, the autopsy finding of multiple blunt impacts, and his post-crime confession to a friend including theft of the victim's money), the Court concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found Tedder guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and robbery.
Peremptory Strikes / Gender Challenge: The Court identified J.E.B. v. Alabama as extending Batson to gender-based peremptory strikes and restated the legal framework: once the challenging party makes a prima facie showing of gender-based discrimination, the proponent of the strike must state a gender-neutral, reasonably specific, case-related explanation. The Court then noted that, "assuming, without deciding," that Tedder had made the prima facie showing, the State met its burden. The State's explanations were treated as gender-neutral and reasonably specific because (a) voir dire revealed some struck male jurors had expressed hostile attitudes toward gay men (a case-related concern given the victim's homosexuality), and (b) other jurors had expressed animus toward the district attorney's office. The Court emphasized that J.E.B. does not preclude the State's legitimate interest in using peremptory challenges to secure a fair and impartial jury; gender cannot simply serve as a proxy for bias.
Other Enumerations: The Court briefly addressed the remaining enumerations (including the Edge-related claim) by stating it had reviewed them and found them without merit. No extended analysis of each remaining claim is provided in the opinion excerpt; the Court simply disposed of them as lacking merit.

The Court's approach focused on applying established standards (Jackson for sufficiency; Batson/J.E.B. for peremptory strikes) and evaluating the State's proffered explanations against the required criteria of neutrality, specificity, and case-relatedness.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment and convictions.

Implications and direct effects:

The convictions for felony murder (with the aggravated assault and battery convictions merged into it) and robbery were upheld, and the sentence of life imprisonment (with 20 years on the robbery count to run concurrently) remains in effect.
On the Batson/J.E.B. claim, the Court assumed the appellant made a prima facie showing but found the State provided gender-neutral, reasonably specific, and case-related reasons for the strikes; thus the peremptory strikes were upheld. The Court noted that J.E.B. does not conflict with the State's legitimate interest in securing an impartial jury, but prevents gender from being used as a mere proxy for bias.
The Court found the appellant's other enumerations, including the Edge-related claims regarding jury recharging, to be without merit. The opinion does not indicate that the Court created any new rule or extended precedent beyond applying existing standards (Jackson; Batson; J.E.B.; and consideration of Edge as argued by appellant).

No broader changes to precedent were announced; the decision affirms the trial court's judgment and leaves the existing legal standards as applied in this case undisturbed.

Source: Tedder v. The State, S95A1151, Supreme Court of Georgia, decided November 20, 1995 (Opinion by Justice Sears). All content in this summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion.

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TEDDER v. THE STATE.

SEARS, Justice.

Appellant Troy Stephen Tedder appeals his convictions for felony murder, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and robbery. We affirm.

The facts proved at trial establish that Tedder, while spending the night in Gainesville, Georgia en route to North Carolina, met the male murder victim in a motel bar, and accompanied him to a motel room. Shortly thereafter, Tedder appeared at the motel front desk shirtless and shoeless, with blood smeared on his chest. Tedder told the desk clerk that he and a friend had fought in a motel room, that he was concerned about the friend's condition, and that he had the key to the motel room, but could not remember which room the key fit. Tedder then fled the motel. Motel employees found the victim, who had been severely beaten, dead in the motel room. The motel room had been ransacked. An autopsy later determined that the victim had died of multiple blunts impacts to his head.

After fleeing to North Carolina, Tedder confessed to a friend that he had murdered the victim after the victim made sexual advances toward him, and that after the killing, he had stolen the victim's money. At trial, Tedder pleaded self-defense, claiming that he had killed the victim after he attempted to sodomize Tedder.

The murder occurred in the early morning on September 17-18, 1993, and Tedder was indicted on March 17, 1994. The trial commenced on November 9, 1994, and the jury returned its guilty verdicts on November 15, 1994. The aggravated assault and battery convictions were merged into the felony murder conviction, and the court sentenced Tedder to life imprisonment, in addition to 20 years on the robbery conviction, to run concurrently. The court's sentencing order was filed on November 16, 1994, and Tedder timely filed a motion for new trial on December 15, 1994. The transcript was certified by the court reporter on December 23, 1994, and the motion for new trial was denied on February 20, 1995. Tedder timely filed a notice of appeal with this Court on March 9, 1995. The appeal was docketed with this Court on April 14, 1995, and submitted for decision without oral argument on June 5, 1995.

1. Having reviewed the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Tedder was guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and robbery.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 ( 99 S.C. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979).

2. Tedder claims that the trial court erred in denying his challenges to the State's exercise of six peremptory strikes against male members of the jury pool. Tedder argues that the peremptory strikes were unconstitutional because they were based solely upon the six male jurors' gender, and the stereotype that the jurors, as heterosexual men, were homophobic, and thus would be unsympathetic toward the homosexual victim in this case.

In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court extended its holding in Batson v. Kentucky to instances where peremptory strikes are exercised solely on the basis of gender. Thus, as it does with race,

___ U.S. ___ ( 114 S.C. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89) (1994).

476 U.S. 79 ( 106 S.C. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69) (1986).

"the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender, or on the assumption that an individual will be biased in a particular case for no reason other than the fact that the person happens to be a woman or happens to be a man."

Once a party challenging the exercise of a peremptory strike makes a prima facie showing of gender-based discrimination, the party exercising the strike must give an explanation for the strike that is gender-neutral, reasonably specific, and related to the case.

See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429-30. The explanation given need not rise to the level of an explanation of a strike for cause. Id.

Assuming, without deciding, that Tedder made a prima facie showing of gender-based discrimination, the State met its burden in providing gender-neutral, reasonably specific, and case-related explanations for its exercise of its peremptory strikes. For example, during voir dire, several of the stricken male jurors expressed hostile attitudes toward gay men, and thus may have been unsympathetic toward the victim in this case. Still other jurors expressed animus toward the district attorney's office. Accordingly, we reject Tedder's first enumeration.

See id. (the ruling in J.E.B. does not conflict with the State's legitimate interest in using its peremptory challenges to secure a fair and impartial jury; rather, gender simply may not "serve as a proxy for bias.").

3. We have reviewed Tedder's other enumerations, and find them to be without merit. Judgment affirmed. All of the Justices concur.

These include claims that: (1) the trial court erred in recharging the jury on felony murder without repeating its earlier Edge instruction (see Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865, 867 n. 3 ( 414 S.E.2d 463) (1992)); and (2) we should extend our ruling in Edge, supra, to this case.